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ABSTRACT
TETYANA BABINA: Destructive Creation at Work:
How Financial Distress Spurs Entrepreneurship.
(Under the direction of Geoffrey Tate)
Why do employees become entrepreneurs? This dissertation shows that firm financial distress
drives the exit of workers to pursue entrepreneurship. In a difference-in-difference setting, I find
that, following unexpected industry shocks, employees at relatively more financially levered public
firms are more likely to exit to found new firms. These new firms are likely created because
financially distressed firms are less able to retain productive workers who exit to found start-ups.
Entrepreneurs exiting financially distressed employers earn higher wages prior to leaving paid
employment and after founding start-ups, as compared to entrepreneurs exiting non-distressed
firms. Consistent with financial distress driving productive workers into entrepreneurship, start-
ups created following financial distress have high future employment growth. Distressed firms are
less able to retain entrepreneurial workers in part because ex ante contracts restricting employee
mobility are not enforceable. In support of this argument, I find that the effect is concentrated in
states with weaker enforcement of non-compete agreements. The results suggest that the social
costs of distress might be lower than the private costs to financially distressed firms.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Why do people start new firms? Why don’t they implement their entrepreneurial ideas within
existing firms? These questions are particularly important, given that many successful firms are
founded by workers who leave paid employment.1 Yet, little is known about when and why workers
leave their employer to become entrepreneurs. This dissertation examines one particular period in
a firm’s existence when it is less likely to be able to retain entrepreneurial workers: during firm
financial distress. While a growing empirical literature studies the effects of firm financial distress
on workers, whether firm financial distress affects new firm creation is an open question. This
dissertation shows that firm financial distress increases the likelihood of workers exiting to found
new firms, spurring entrepreneurial activity.
Frictionless markets obviate the need for new firms because economic activity can be carried
out within already existing firms. Frictions, however, can lead to new firm creation and financial
distress can exacerbate those frictions (Williamson (1975); Grossman and Hart (1986)). Financial
distress makes contracting more difficult, since firms in distress have poor incentives to honor con-
tracts (Maksimovic and Titman (1991)). Contracting difficulties and job insecurity might prompt
productive workers with ideas for new products or services to leave employment to found new
firms (Lucas (1978)). Alternatively, firm financial distress can increase the number of start-ups
founded by laid-off workers perceived as low quality by other firms (Gibbons and Katz (1991)).
To test these theories, I define firm financial distress as occurring when a firm with high ex ante
financial leverage is hit by a large, unexpected, negative industry-wide shock (Opler and Titman
1Bhide (2000) reports that 71% of firm founders in the Inc. 500 (a list of the fastest-growing privately held firms in the
U.S.) claim that they had replicated or modified an idea that they had identified in previous employment, compared
with only 4% who had found their idea through systematic search.
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(1994)).2 A levered firm hit by a shock has to pay debt holders out of its sparse cash flows. Those
payments reduce the resources available for the firm to fulfill implicit obligations, such as invest-
ing in workers’ ideas, thus making the firm a less attractive employer to entrepreneurial workers.
Additionally, large shocks increase bankruptcy risk and decrease job security in firms with larger
ex ante debt burdens. Consistent with the existing literature that finds lower employment growth in
financially distressed firms, I find that relatively more levered firms have lower future employment
growth following industry shocks.
To estimate the effect of firm financial distress on entrepreneurship, I use U.S. Census employer-
employee matched panel data. Specifically, I measure the propensity of workers at public firms to
transition into start-ups. At each establishment of a given public firm, I calculate the percentage of
workers who exit and found start-ups within two years after the firm’s exposure to a shock. Using
this establishment-level entrepreneurship panel, I estimate a difference-in-difference model while
including industry-year and establishment fixed effects. I find that following firm financial dis-
tress, employees are significantly more likely to exit to found start-ups. A one standard deviation
increase in ex ante financial leverage increases the post-shock entrepreneurship rate by 25% from
the mean entrepreneurship rate of 1.5% to 1.9%. I also document that neither industry distress
itself nor elevated firm leverage prior to normal, non-distress industry conditions is associated with
higher exit rates of workers into entrepreneurship. This result suggests that both are needed to have
an effect on firms’ retention of entrepreneurial workers.
The identification strategy described above has several advantages. First, the difference-in-
difference strategy identifies the effect of firm financial distress on entrepreneurship by measuring
the incremental effect of the shock on relatively more levered firms. The inclusion of leverage
and industry shock variables control for the general effects of leverage and industry shocks on
entrepreneurship. Second, the inclusion of industry-year fixed effects isolates the effect of firm
financial leverage on workers who otherwise face the same industry conditions, and hence face the
2An industry shock is defined based on negative industry sales growth to identify cash flow shock and based on a large
negative industry stock return to ensure that the shock is unanticipated.
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same job opportunities and incentives to found firms. Last, adding establishment fixed effects ad-
dresses additional concerns associated with unobservable, time-invariant heterogeneity that might
correlate with both firm leverage and worker entrepreneurship, such as differences in workforce
risk tolerance.
I next examine the robustness of the results to some additional concerns. The difference-in-
difference identification strategy requires that financially distressed firms do not experience dif-
ferential trends in entrepreneurship prior to the shock. I find no evidence of an increase in en-
trepreneurship leading up to financial distress. Additionally, the estimates do not change when I
include time-varying firm-level variables, such as profitability and Tobin’s Q, and establishment-
level variables, such as proxies for mean worker risk aversion and wealth. The stability of the
coefficients helps to mitigate the concern that time-varying omitted factors drive both leverage and
entrepreneurship. Moreover, the estimates remain stable when I include state-year fixed effects,
reducing the possibility that regional shocks drive changes in leverage and worker entrepreneur-
ship. Finally, the increase in entrepreneurship might be due to higher worker turnover in financially
distressed firms. When I re-normalize the count of entrepreneurs by the number of departing em-
ployees to directly control for overall turnover, I again find that departing workers are more likely
to found start-ups after firm financial distress.
Having established that firm financial distress spurs worker movement to start-ups, I examine
whether it changes the quality of entrepreneurship as the first step to testing the mechanisms behind
the main findings. While I am unable to observe whether start-up founders quit or were laid off, I
do explore whether high- or low-quality workers are responsible for the new firms. If the increase
is driven by laid-off workers, we might observe a decline in the average quality of entrepreneurs
and the firms they found. Generally, layoffs are more common among lower quality workers
(Gibbons and Katz (1991)), and start-ups of laid-off workers are less likely to create jobs or survive
(Parker (2009); Pfeiffer and Reize (2000)). Conversely, if the increase is driven by voluntary exits,
entrepreneur quality might increase with firm financial distress. Distressed firms are likely less able
to retain productive workers, who are also more likely to choose entrepreneurship (Lucas (1978)).
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Using earnings to proxy for worker quality, several findings suggest that workers who transi-
tion into entrepreneurship during financial distress are high-quality workers. First, within estab-
lishments of financially distressed firms, the exit of workers to found start-ups is more pronounced
among higher wage earners. Second, entrepreneurs from financially distressed firms earn higher
wages prior to departure and after joining start-ups than entrepreneurs from non-distressed firms.
Moreover, the start-ups of entrepreneurs exiting financially distressed employers have higher future
employment growth, but similar survival rates to the start-ups of entrepreneurs from non-distressed
firms. These results favor the interpretation that the departure of workers from distressed firms to
found new firms is driven by voluntary exits of high quality workers, and not by workers who are
laid off.
What makes high-quality workers at financially distressed firms exit to found new firms? Both
contracting and financing frictions are likely important. Workers might not want to deal with
a financially distressed employer that has poor incentives to honor its contracts (Titman (1984);
Maksimovic and Titman (1991)). Such a firm might also be less able to access external capital
markets and face financing constraints to retain entrepreneurial workers. A worker with ideas for
new products or services might be less willing to develop them within a financially distressed firm
and be particularly inclined to leave, causing a “brain drain”.
For the “brain drain” hypothesis to hold, one must assume that firms in financial distress do
not have ex ante contractual means to discourage their workers from starting competing new firms.
This assumption is likely relevant, since I find that the entrepreneurs from financially distressed
firms are not more likely to switch industries. One of the standard ways to hold onto workers is
through non-compete agreements, which restrict employee mobility into competing firms, existing
or new. While non-compete agreements are commonplace in all US states, there is significant inter-
state variation in the degree of their enforcement. If a financially distressed employer is less able
to enforce these ex ante contracts, then workers should be more likely to leave to found start-ups.
Indeed, I find that the increase in entrepreneurship spawned from distressed firms is concentrated
in states with less strict enforcement of non-compete agreements, suggesting that distressed firms
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are less able to retain entrepreneurial workers.
Another assumption underlying the “brain drain” hypothesis is that financially distressed firms
are less able to access external capital markets, and hence less able to retain productive workers.
Thus, I look at a subset of firms that are particularly likely to have limited access to external capital:
small and young firms. I test whether entrepreneurship rates are higher in smaller and younger
financially distressed firms. I find that the treatment effect is higher in these firms, suggesting that
financing constraints weaken a firm’s ability to retain entrepreneurial workers.
Overall, my results suggest that corporate financial distress triggers worker exit to pursue en-
trepreneurship. Financial distress destroys firm-worker ties, propelling workers to create their
own firms as a way to seek better opportunities. This “destructive creation” suggests that some
new firms arise when existing firms, weakened by debt during shocks, are less able to retain en-
trepreneurial workers. While worker entrepreneurship does not likely benefit distressed firms, the
findings suggest a silver lining to distress. Productive workers from financially distressed firms
start successful new ventures at a higher rate, suggesting that productive resources get reallocated
from old to new firms and that the social costs of financial distress might be lower than the private
costs to financially distressed firms.
By providing direct evidence that financially distressed firms experience a “brain drain” of
productive workers into new firms, this dissertation contributes to the literature on indirect costs
of distress. Despite large tax and other benefits of debt, firms seem to be reluctant to use debt
financing (Graham (2000)). It has long been proposed that indirect costs of distress explain the
under-leverage phenomenon (Titman (1984)). A growing literature argues that part of the indirect
costs is borne by workers, discouraging firms from using debt (Berk, Stanton, and Zechner (2010)).
Distressed firms reduce wages (Benmelech, Bergman, and Enriquez (2012), Graham, Kim, Li, and
Qiu (2015)) and downsize their workforces (Hotchkiss (1995); Agrawal and Matsa (2013)). These
costs might negatively affect a firm’s ability to attract and retain human capital. Brown and Matsa
(2012) show that distressed employers face reduced labor supply from outside workers.3 This
3In addition to the labor market effects, distress may affect firm performance (Opler and Titman (1994); Andrade
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dissertation shows that firms might be reluctant to use debt financing to avoid losing productive
workers to competing new firms during financial distress.
This dissertation is also related to the literature on “entrepreneurial spawning”. Gompers,
Lerner, and Scharfstein (2005) find that venture capital-backed, young, and focused firms, as well
as firms in California and Massachusetts, have higher employee entrepreneurship. Other papers
studying the decision of workers to leave their employers and pursue entrepreneurship include An-
ton and Yao (1995); Gromb and Scharfstein (2002); Hellmann (2002, 2007); Burton, Sorensen,
and Beckman (2002); Stuart and Sorenson (2003); Klepper and Sleeper (2005); Carnahan, Agar-
wal, and Campbell (2012). This dissertation is the first to show that financial leverage of existing
firms affects “entrepreneurial spawning”. More broadly, this dissertation is connected to empirical
work on the boundaries of the firm (e.g., Robinson (2008); Seru (2014); Bernstein (2015)).
By showing that entrepreneurship in financially distressed firms is higher in smaller and younger
firms, this dissertation also provides a novel explanation for why those firms spawn more start-ups.
The existing literature argues that preference sorting plays a major role in generating the small
and young firm effect; i.e., small and young firms attract workers with prior preferences for au-
tonomy, who are similarly drawn into entrepreneurship (Elfenbein, Hamilton, and Zenger (2010);
Ouimet and Zarutskie (2014)). However, an alternate finance-oriented explanation centers around
the finding that younger firms are more financially levered than public firms (Robb and Robinson
(2014)). This higher leverage makes smaller, younger firms more vulnerable to shocks and less
able to retain entrepreneurial employees.
The rest of the dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 describes the data and the empirical
strategy. Chapter 3 provides the main results, 4 discusses potential channels, and 5 concludes.
and Kaplan (1998)); real asset prices (Pulvino (1998)); competitors’ collateral values (Benmelech and Bergman
(2011)); and how firms compete in product markets, including entry (Chevalier (1995a)), exit (Kovenock and Phillips
(1997); Zingales (1998)), pricing (Chevalier (1995b); Phillips (1995); Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996)), product
quality (Rose (1990); Borenstein and Rose (2003); Matsa (2011); Phillips and Sertsios (2013)), and product prices
(Hortac¸su, Matvos, Syverson, and Venkataraman (2013)).
6
CHAPTER 2: DATA
2.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection
I use firm-, establishment-, and worker-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, and firm- and
industry segment-level data from the Compustat/CRSP databases. The U.S. Census Bureau’s Lon-
gitudinal Business Database (LBD) provides information on firm age, diversification, employment,
and survival, as well as on the industry and geography of firms’ establishments. The U.S. Census
Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) database provides worker-level
data. I use the Compustat Fundamental Annual Database to obtain information on firm-level vari-
ables, CRSP to obtain stock return information, and Compustat Business Segment files to obtain
sales of firms’ industry segments.
Establishment- and Worker-level Data
The LBD is an annual panel data set that covers all U.S. business establishments with paid
employees beginning in 1976. The data are derived from the register of establishments maintained
by the Internal Revenue Service of the U.S. Treasury Department. An establishment is a single
physical location where business is conducted (Jarmin and Miranda (2002)). The LBD assigns
each establishment a unique identifier that allows researchers to track the establishment through
time, as well as a firm-level identifier to aggregate information to the firm level and track firms
through time. Information is available on industry, physical location, total employment, and payroll
along with establishments’ births and closures. Thus, the LBD allows the identification of start-ups
among employer firms as well as start-ups’ future employment growth and exit.
I use the LBD to identify firms and to measure firm age. Age is available only at the establish-
ment level and a firm may consist of many establishments. For that reason, I follow the approach
taken in the literature and define firm age as equal to the age of the oldest establishment that the firm
owns in the first year the firm is observed in the LBD (Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2012)).
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This definition of firm age is robust to misclassifying an establishment that changes ownership
through mergers and acquisitions as a firm birth, since a firm is defined as new only when all of its
establishments are new. Since the LBD only covers employer firms and does not include Schedule
C self-employed activity, my analysis is limited to the formation of employer firms. As such, the
commencement of Schedule C self-employed activity is unmeasured and is not considered to be
entrepreneurship in this sample.
The LEHD database is a quarterly panel that identifies the employees of each firm in the U.S.
and records worker compensation from the states’ unemployment insurance benefit programs. It
covers 95% of private sector employment and is generally comparable from state to state.1 The
Census Bureau currently provides access to employment records from 25 states.2 The data cover-
age starts in 1990 for several states and increases over time, ending in 2008. For each employee,
the LEHD data provide age, gender, race, place of birth, and citizenship status. The database also
links workers directly to the workers’ employing entity in a given state, using State Employer Iden-
tification Numbers (SEIN), and provides worker quarterly earnings at the employing SEIN. The
LEHD data include the federal employer identification number (EIN), which allows researchers to
link the LEHD data to the firm identifiers in the LBD and to track employees dynamically from
firm to firm. I match the LBD establishments to SEINs in the LEHD data as of the first quarter
of each year using the internal Census bridge file.3 That match yields an annual panel of SEINs
of the LBD firms in the first quarter of each year. With a slight abuse of notation, I call SEINs
“establishments” throughout the dissertation.
For the sample of matched firms, I take a snapshot of all employees as of the first quarter of each
year. This step creates an annual panel of the workforce potentially exposed to a distress shock
1Abowd, Stephens, Vilhuber, Andersson, McKinney, Roemer, and Woodcock (2009) provides a detailed description
of the program and the data it generates. Stevens (2007) discusses LEHD coverage issues.
2The covered states are Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mon-
tana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
3I merge establishments of the two Census sets as of the first quarter of each year because the LBD measures employ-
ment as of March 12 of each year.
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during that year. Using longitudinally consistent individual identifiers available in the LEHD data,
I then track these employees over time. I take a second snapshot of these same workers exactly
three years later, allowing for two full years to pass since the end of the year during which a distress
event is defined. Figure 2.1 presents the timeline. The lag is motivated by the time necessary to
start a firm and by the time it takes for a new firm to appear in the Census data.4 I identify the
following groups: (1) employees who remain working for the original firm; (2) employees who are
now employed at a different firm that I define as a start-up (i.e., a firm founded during or after the
year during which the distress is defined; or, equivalently, a firm that is three years old or younger);
(3) employees who are now employed at a different firm, which had existed prior to the year during
which the distress is defined (i.e., a firm that is more than three years old); (4) employees who are
now employed at a different firm of unknown age; and (5) employees who are no longer observed
in the data.5 Employees may be dropped from the data because they either leave the work force or
are now employed in an area outside the LEHD data coverage.
Equating entrepreneurship with new venture creation is now a standard practice in the business
studies approach to entrepreneurship (Shane and Venkataraman (2000)). Anyone who joins a start-
up can be viewed as entrepreneurial due to the high risk associated with new ventures, but not all
employees who move to start-ups are likely to be the start-up founders. The LEHD data do not
designate the founders of a new firm. While earnings in the LEHD data include bonus pay and
similar compensation, the data do not consistently record equity ownership of individuals. To
proxy for company founders, I define an entrepreneur as an employee who moves to a start-up and
is one of the top five earners at that start-up.6 Using these assumptions, I then calculate the future
establishment-level entrepreneurship rate as the percent of an establishment’s employees in year
zero who become entrepreneurs in three years. I use this entrepreneurship variable as the main
4Parker (2009) reports that the median time period needed by an entrepreneur to plan and open a company is more
than a year.
5If the employee works for several firms in the future, I select the employer with the highest earnings. The age of some
firms is unknown, since not all firms in the LEHD data map to the LBD, which is used to determine firm age.
6Similarly, Kerr, Kerr, and Nanda (2014) defines entrepreneurship based on earnings rankings in the LEHD data.
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dependent variable in establishment-level analysis.
Industry Distress and Financial Leverage Data
Following Opler and Titman (1994), a three-digit SIC code industry is classified as distressed
in a given year (base year) if from the beginning of that year the median two-year sales growth
of public firms’ segments in that industry is negative and the median two-year stock return is less
than –30%. A fall in demand and an increase in input prices are typical drivers of industry distress,
as reported by Gopalan and Xie (2011).
Using the Compustat Fundamental Annual Database to obtain firm sales information, CRSP to
get stock returns, and the Compustat Business Segment Database to retrieve firm industry segment
sales data, I select all single industry firm-years (firm-years with a single SIC-3 industry segment
with positive sales in the Compustat Business Segment Database). The industry distress panel
is generated by excluding observations (1) for which the reported industry segment sales differ
from the consolidated firm sales by more than 5% (to exclude firms that have sales in smaller,
unreported segments); (2) with missing sales and stock return information; (3) with sales of less
than $20 million U.S. dollars; (4) in the financial sector (SIC codes 6000-6999); (5) in regulated
industries (SIC codes 4900-4999); and (6) in industries with fewer than four firms.
I merge the industry distress panel with the establishment-level panel using establishment in-
dustry information, such that the workers are identified as of the first quarter of each industry
distress year.
Since the Census data do not have information on firm leverage, I merge the establishment-level
panel with Compustat using the internal Census Compustat/LBD crosswalk. This limits the sample
of workers potentially exposed to financial distress to employees of public firms. However, these
employees are tracked going forward to both public and private firms. The inclusion of private
firms is necessary because majority of start-ups fall into this category. I discuss the consequences
of this restriction in Section 3.4.
For firm financial leverage, I use book leverage measured as the ratio of long-term debt plus
debt in current liabilities normalized by total firm assets (Opler and Titman (1994); Lemmon,
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Roberts, and Zender (2008)). I use book leverage because market values might forecast future
growth opportunities. Firms that experience a loss of growth opportunities will experience a de-
cline in equity values and a corresponding increase in their leverage ratios, as measured by market
values. If the exit of workers during financial distress is related to the availability of forfeited in-
vestment opportunities, using market-based leverage will bias downwards the estimates of worker
entrepreneurship due to financial distress.
2.2 Empirical Methodology
I identify a financially distressed firm as a firm with high ex ante financial leverage that is hit
by a large, unexpected, negative, industry-wide shock. Such a firm must pay debt holders out of
its sparse cash flows, reducing the resources available to fulfill implicit obligations, such as paying
promised wage increases or investing in workers’ ideas. A levered firm hit by a shock becomes a
less attractive employer. Additionally, large shocks increase bankruptcy risk and job insecurity in
firms with larger ex ante debt burdens. The strategy was first proposed by Opler and Titman (1994)
and its variant was recently used by Giroud and Mueller (2015), who interacted ex ante leverage
with a demand shock measured by changes in housing prices. Following Opler and Titman (1994),
I define an industry as being in distress if the median sales growth of firms in that industry is
negative (to identify cash flow shock) and the median stock return is less than –30% (to ensure that
the shock is unanticipated).
The identification strategy has several advantages. First, the definition of firm financial distress
based on a shock unrelated to firm idiosyncratic performance helps reduce concerns that unob-
servable firm-level factors drive both worker entrepreneurship and firm financial leverage. For
example, worker movement from bankrupt firms into start-ups might be driven by the lack of in-
vestment opportunities that leads firms to bankruptcy. Second, the shock is based on industry stock
return, making it less likely that firms will have adjusted their leverage in anticipation. Third, a
large shock is likely to affect the behavior of workers who face labor market frictions and hence
are unlikely to break employment relationships after smaller shocks. Finally, firms are likely to be
sufficiently distant from their equilibrium leverage ratios, helping to identify the effect of financial
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distress on worker exit into start-ups (Hennessy and Strebulaev (2015)).
The strategy also has its limitations. Industry conditions can drive firms’ demand for labor as
well as workers’ job opportunities and the incentives to found firms. I therefore include industry-
year fixed effects to isolate the effect of firm financial leverage on workers who otherwise face
the same industry conditions. Additionally, firms differentially exposed to industry shocks might
choose a capital structure based on unobservable characteristics that correlate with worker en-
trepreneurship following industry shocks. The direction of the potential bias is ambiguous. If more
risk-tolerant workers, who are more likely to start new businesses, sort into riskier, higher-leverage
firms, then this sorting would bias upward the estimates of rates of worker entrepreneurship in
distressed firms (Berk et al. (2010)). Conversely, the estimates might be biased downward if firms
with high growth options, which are also likely to have more entrepreneurial workers, choose lower
leverage levels (Myers and Majluf (1984); Gompers et al. (2005)). I add establishment fixed effects
to control for time-invariant, unobservable heterogeneity.
Finally, regional factors may correlate with investments of existing firms, labor market con-
ditions, and rates of entrepreneurship (Dougal, Parsons, and Titman (2015); Schmalz, Sraer, and
Thesmar (2013)). This issue is addressed by including state-year fixed effects.
Following Opler and Titman (1994), I measure the firm financial leverage ratio two years prior
to the base year, to ensure that there is no reverse causality from poor performance (due to industry
distress) to high leverage.
To examine the effect of firm financial distress on the propensity of workers to start their own
firms, I use a difference-in-difference approach. Specifically, I estimate at the establishment-level:
yefist+3 = βI × IndDistressit + βL × Leverageft−2
+ βFD × Leverageft−2 × IndDistressit + αe + αit + αst + γ′Xefist + efist
(2.1)
where e indexes establishment; f indexes firm; i indexes industry; s indexes state; t indexes time in
years; y is the dependent variable of interest (i.e., the percent of employees at an establishment e
of the firm f in industry i at time t who become entrepreneurs at t+3); Leverage is the firm book
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financial leverage ratio lagged by two periods from the base year t; IndDistress is the industry
distress indicator variable equal to one if industry i is in distress in year t; αe, αit, and αst are
establishment, industry-year, and state-year fixed effects, respectively; X is a vector of control
variables; and  is the error term.
The main coefficient of interest identifying the effect of financial distress, βFD, measures the
effect of financial leverage on worker entrepreneurship following periods of industry distress rela-
tive to worker entrepreneurship after non-distress industry years, measured by βL. Under the null
hypothesis that industry downturns do not accelerate the exit of employees from relatively more
levered firms into entrepreneurship, βFD should be equal to zero. Under the alternative hypoth-
esis that industry shocks disproportionally affect more levered firms and propel employees into
entrepreneurship, βFD is expected to be positive and measures how the increase in ex ante leverage
impacts the percentage of employees who found start-ups after an industry distress year in excess
of start-ups founded after non-distress industry years. For ease of exposition, I refer to relatively
more levered firms with establishments in industry distress as being financially distressed.
Including establishment, industry-year, and state-year fixed effects controls for time-varying
industry and local conditions as well as unobservable, time-invariant heterogeneity. Adding time-
varying establishment and firm-level characteristics helps overcome some specific additional con-
cerns. I include two establishment-level controls, measured as of the first quarter of the base year
to reflect characteristics of workers in the establishment-worker panel: (1) establishment size (to
control for the possibility that changes in establishment size drive employee entrepreneurship in
financially distressed firms) and (2) establishment mean wage (to control for the possibility that
more levered firms pay higher wages, relaxing capital constraints associated with opening a new
business). The detailed description of variable construction is in Appendix B.
Economically weaker firms might become more levered and hence more vulnerable to the
shock. For that reason, I also control for past profitability and investment opportunities. I add
the following one year lagged firm-level variables: return on assets; sales growth; Tobin’s Q; as
well as investments and research and development expenses, both normalized by total firm assets.
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Some firm-level variables have been found to correlate with the propensity of employees to found
new firms. Gompers et al. (2005) find that more employees leave young and focused firms to join
start-ups. I include firm age and diversification status as control variables. I also control for firm
size, asset tangibility, and firm cash holdings to account for potential changes in firm scale and
asset characteristics that might correlate with changes in firm investment policy and leverage.
An important residual concern is that serial correlation of the error term can lead to under-
stated standard errors, especially in difference-in-differences estimations (Bertrand, Duflo, and
Mullainathan (2004)). In all regressions, I cluster standard errors at the SIC–3 industry level, to
account for the presence of serial correlation within the same establishment and for any arbitrary
correlation of the error terms across establishments in the same industry in any given year as well
as over time.
To validate the strategy and determine that relatively more levered firms are more affected by in-
dustry distress, I estimate equation 2.1 with future establishment employment growth as the depen-
dent variable. I provide regression estimates in Table A.1 in the Appendix. Consistent with prior
literature, I find that establishments in financial distress have negative future employment growth.
For example, using U.S. Census data, Giroud and Mueller (2015) find that establishments of rel-
atively more financially levered firms have lower employment growth following demand shocks
measured by changes in local housing prices.
2.3 Summary Statistics
The sample period extends from 1990 through 2003. (Census data are available from 1990
through 2008. I stop in 2003 to match the sample period with the worker- and startup-level analy-
sis described in section 3.2). To be included in the sample, an establishment must (1) have positive
employment, (2) have industry distress information, (3) have all establishment- and firm-level vari-
ables used in this study, and (4) be in the scope of the Economic Census.7 Since the identification
7Industries not in the scope include Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (SIC Division A), Railroads (SIC 40), U.S. Postal
Service (SIC 43), Elementary and Secondary Schools (SIC 821), Colleges and Universities (SIC 822), Labor Organi-
zations (SIC 863), Political Organizations (SIC 865), Religious Organizations (SIC 866), Certificated Passenger Air
Carriers (part of SIC 4512), and Public Administration (SIC Division J).
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strategy requires information on the industry affiliation of workers, I also exclude observations in
which I cannot assign workers uniquely to a single industry. The final sample contains 91,100
establishment-years (rounded to the nearest hundred due to the Census Bureau’s disclosure poli-
cies).
An average establishment comes from an industry segment within a firm that comprises 61% of
the total firm employment (61.3/61.1% in industry distress/non-distress years), reflecting the fact
that the sample consists mainly of establishments from economically significant industries within
the firm operations. In the sample, 3.1% of establishment-years are classified as being in industry
distress – similar to Opler and Titman (1994), who identify 3% of observations to be in industry
distress. The small percent of observations in industry distress reflects the severity of the shock.
To gauge the representativeness of observations exposed to industry shocks, Table 2.1 provides
summary statistics of ex ante establishment and firm characteristics. Column [1] presents results
using all available establishment-years. Column [2] ([3]) limits observations to non-distress (dis-
tress) industry-years. For each variable, columns [1] - [3] report the mean (standard deviation),
which is calculated at the establishment-year level.8 Column [4] provides differences in means
for observations during industry distress vs. non-distress years. By ex ante establishment char-
acteristics, observations in industry distress do not differ significantly from those in non-distress
years. However, establishment-years in industry distress belong to older firms with lower finan-
cial leverage, fewer tangible assets, and more cash. By measures of total capital, profitability, and
investment opportunities, establishment-years look similar across the two industry conditions.
Table 2.2 provides summary statistics of future worker entrepreneurship calculated at the es-
tablishment level. According to the main definition of entrepreneurship used in this dissertation
(variable “Pct Entrepreneurs”), an average of 1.5% of public firm employees will leave and be-
come entrepreneurs in a subsequent three-year period, measured from the first quarter of the base
year (the year during which distress is defined) to the first quarter three years later. Similarly, 1.4
new start-ups per 100 workers are created over the three-year period (variable “Pct Startups”). The
8Due to the Census Bureaus disclosure policy, I cannot report median or other percentile values.
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discrepancy between the two variables is likely due to some start-ups being founded by former
co-workers. Although the figures seem small, they are consistent with the previous estimates of
employer firm creation rates. Business Dynamics Statistics, created from the LBD by the U.S.
Census Department, identified about 11 new employer establishments per 100,000 individuals per
quarter in 2012, or 1.32% over three years. Similarly, using the LBD/LEHD matched data Kerr
et al. (2014) find that 1.7% of workers transition to entrepreneurship over a four-year period.9 On
average, among employees who switch employers, only 4% will become entrepreneurs (variable
“Pct Entrepreneurs/Change Employer”). When I consider only the top earner in a start-up as an
entrepreneur, the mean future entrepreneurship rate falls to 0.5% (variable “Pct Main Founder”),
highlighting rare worker-to-top-founder transitions.
To get a sense of correlation between industry shocks and post-shock worker entrepreneurship,
Table 2.2 also provides statistics on worker entrepreneurship by industry distress indicator. In
the univariate analysis, the rates of entrepreneurship become slightly higher after industry distress
years, but the difference is not consistently significant. I next turn to multivariate analysis to
determine if industry shocks disproportionally affect the ability of relatively more levered firms to
retain entrepreneurial employees.
9The annual transitions into self-employment are substantially higher. The Kauffman Foundation estimates that 0.3%
of people open up a new business (employer or non-employer) per month in 2012 (Fairlie (2013), pp. 4 and 6).
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Figure 2.1: Timeline
This graph shows when the main variables are measured. Following Opler and Titman (1994), I identify an industry to
be in distress in a base year, t = 0, if from the beginning of that year the median two-year sales growth of firms in that
industry is negative and the median two-year stock return is less than -30%. I measure firm book financial leverage
ratio (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, normalized by total firm assets) two years prior to the base year,
at t = −2. Firms’ workers are identified as of the first quarter of the base year, at t = 0. Allowing for two full years
to pass since the end of the base year during which the distress is defined, I determine where those workers are in the
first quarter of t = +3: stay with the firm, leave to work for another firm that existed prior to t = 0, drop out from
the employment sample, or leave to work for a startup (a firm founded from t = 0 to t = +3, inclusively). In the first
quarter of t = +3, a former worker is an entrepreneur if he works at a startup and is one of the top five earners at that
start-up.
+2 +1 0 -1 -2 +3 
Measure industry 
sales and stock returns 
Measure firm 
financial leverage 
Define industry shock 
(Base year = Year 0) 
Time, years 
Identify entrepreneurs among the workers 
from the 1st Qtr of Year 0 
1st Qtr 1st Qtr 
Identify firm’s 
workers 
Start-up creation 
period 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics: Ex Ante Establishment and Parent Firm Characteristics
This table presents establishment-level summary statistics. The sample consists of establishments of U.S. public firms,
and extends from 1990 through 2003. “All” refers to all observations in the sample. “Not Industry Distress” refers to
observations not in industry distress years. “Industry Distress” refers to observations in industry distress years. 3.1%
of establishment-years are classified as being in industry distress years. In columns [1] - [3], sample means (standard
deviations) are computed across all establishment-year observations. Column [4] provides differences in means. All
establishment-level variables are measured as of the first quarter of the base year (the year during which distress is
defined). Establishment Size is the natural logarithm of establishment employment. Establishment Mean Wage is the
natural logarithm of the ratio of an establishment’s payroll to employment. Leverage is the firm book financial leverage
ratio (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, normalized by total firm assets) lagged by two years from the base
year. Firm Age is equal to the age of the oldest establishment that a firm owns. Diversified Firm is an indicator variable
equal to one if a firm owns establishments in more than one SIC–3 industry. The remaining firm variables are lagged
by one year from the base year. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at
the SIC–3 industry code. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
All Not Industry Industry Difference
Distress Distress ([3] - [2])
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Ex Ante Establishment Characteristics
Establishment Size 4.208 4.199 4.458 0.258
(1.762) (1.757) (1.920)
Establishment Mean Wage 9.090 9.082 9.339 0.257
(0.857) (0.853) (0.933)
Establishment Mean Worker Age 37.187 37.150 38.338 1.188
(6.805) (6.829) (5.921)
Establishment Percent Female 0.440 0.442 0.383 -0.059
(0.275) (0.276) (0.248)
Establishment Mean Worker Education 13.610 13.604 13.824 0.220
(1.079) (1.077) (1.106)
Establishment Mean Worker Tenure 1.984 1.983 2.021 0.038
(1.596) (1.595) (1.638)
Ex Ante Firm Characteristics
Leverage 0.255 0.257 0.213 -0.043∗∗
(0.204) (0.205) (0.175)
Firm Age 21.285 21.237 22.777 1.541∗∗∗
(5.262) (5.252) (5.360)
Diversified Firm 0.941 0.942 0.920 -0.022
(0.236) (0.234) (0.271)
Firm Sales Growth 0.163 0.162 0.185 0.023
(0.315) (0.313) (0.364)
Firm Return on Assets 0.172 0.173 0.155 -0.018
(0.114) (0.113) (0.121)
Firm Investments 0.077 0.077 0.064 -0.013
(0.074) (0.074) (0.062)
Firm R&D 0.016 0.016 0.027 0.012
(0.041) (0.041) (0.056)
Firm Tobin’s Q 0.464 0.464 0.468 0.004
(0.483) (0.481) (0.550)
Firm Size 6.831 6.827 6.960 0.133
(1.870) (1.866) (1.987)
Firm Asset Tangibility 0.313 0.317 0.196 -0.121∗∗∗
(0.208) (0.208) (0.158)
Firm Cash 0.086 0.085 0.114 0.029∗∗
(0.113) (0.112) (0.150)
Number of Observations 91,100 88,276 2,824
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: Ex Post Worker Entrepreneurship
This table presents establishment-level summary statistics. The sample consists of establishments of U.S. public firms,
and extends from 1990 through 2003. “All” refers to all observations in the sample. “Not Industry Distress” refers to
observations not in industry distress years. “Industry Distress” refers to observations in industry distress years. 3.1%
of establishment-years are classified as being in industry distress years. In columns [1] - [3], sample means (standard
deviations) are computed across all establishment-year observations. Column [4] provides differences in means. Pct
Entrepreneurs is the count of an establishment’s workers defined as future entrepreneurs two years after the base
year (the year during which distress is defined), normalized by base year establishment employment and expressed
in percentage terms; a worker is a future entrepreneur if, two years after the base year, he works at a start-up (a firm
founded during or after the base year) and is also one of the top five earners at that start-up (main definition). Pct
Entrepreneurs/Change Employer is the count of an establishment’s workers who are defined as future entrepreneurs
according to the main definition, normalized by the number of the establishment’s employees who work for a different
employer two years after the base year and expressed in percentage terms. Pct Main Founder is the count of an
establishment’s workers who, two years after the base year, work at start-ups and are also the top earners at those
start-ups, normalized by base year establishment employment and expressed in percentage terms. Pct Startups is the
count of unique start-ups associated with future entrepreneurs defined according to the main definition, normalized
by base year establishment employment and expressed in percentage terms. Detailed variable definitions are in the
Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC–3 industry code. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels.
All Not Industry Industry Difference
Distress Distress ([3] - [2])
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Pct Entrepreneurs 1.509 1.504 1.643 0.139
(3.937) (3.944) (3.700)
Pct Entrepreneurs/Change Employer 4.070 4.069 4.127 0.058
(9.003) (9.007) (8.885)
Pct Main Founder 0.520 0.518 0.605 0.087∗
(2.351) (2.362) (1.994)
Pct Startups 1.385 1.382 1.467 0.085
(0.915) (0.913) (0.979)
Number of Observations 91,100 88,276 2,824
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CHAPTER 3: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
3.1 The Effect of Financial Distress on the Quantity of Worker Entrepreneurship
In this section, I use the difference-in-difference approach, described in section 2.2, to study
the effects of financial distress on the rate of worker entrepreneurship.
The Effect of Financial Distress on the Rate of Worker Entrepreneurship
Table 3.1 shows the effect of firm financial leverage on future employee entrepreneurship after
non-distressed and after distressed industry-years. Columns [1] - [3] show the effect of financial
distress on the rate of future employee entrepreneurship after controlling for time-varying industry
conditions by including industry-year fixed effects. In these regressions, high leverage is defined
relative to other firms in the same industry and year. After non-distress industry years, financial
leverage has a positive but economically small effect on employee entrepreneurship. The effect
of financial leverage on the future entrepreneurship rate increases five-fold after industry distress
years. A one standard deviation increase in ex ante leverage increases the rate of departures to
entrepreneurship after industry distress years by a quarter of a percentage point, or a 17% increase
from the average establishment-level entrepreneurship rate of 1.5%.
Columns [2] and [3] include controls for other time-varying factors. In column [2], the in-
clusion of the state-year fixed effects does not change the estimates of the interaction coefficient,
reducing the likelihood that local shocks drive worker entrepreneurship in financially distressed
firms. In column [3], I account for the possibility that time-varying establishment or firm charac-
teristics drive the results. Establishment-level controls are establishment size and average wage.1
Firm-level controls are firm age, diversification, and the following financial variables lagged by
1The inclusion of worker characteristics that might be correlated with the propensity to take risk (age and gender)
or with the experience required to open up a business (education and total labor market experience) averaged at the
establishment-year level did not change the magnitude or the significance of the main coefficients.
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one year from the base year: sales growth, return on assets, investments, R&D expenses, Tobin’s
Q, firm size, asset tangibility, and cash holdings. The estimates of the main coefficient do not
change, suggesting that time-varying establishment or firm characteristics are less likely to be the
main drivers of the results.2
Little is known about how public firm characteristics correlate with the rate of worker tran-
sitions into young employer firms. I therefore highlight some interesting correlations in Column
[3]. Within an industry-year, relatively larger establishments experience lower rates of worker en-
trepreneurship. This result might suggest that workers in smaller establishments likely have more
diverse responsibilities, and thus acquire the broader skill sets that are helpful in entrepreneur-
ship (Lazear (2009)). Similar to findings in Gompers et al. (2005), who study venture-backed
start-ups, fewer workers exit older and diversified firms to join employer start-ups, VC-backed
or not. Establishments of firms with past sales growth and investments above industry average
experience higher rates of entrepreneurship. Spawning does not depend significantly on above-
industry-average R&D expenses, Tobin’s Q, or cash holdings, but is more pronounced in firms
with fewer tangible assets. Consistent with Elfenbein et al. (2010), I find a negative correlation
between firm size and exit rates of workers into start-ups.
Columns [4] - [6] of Table 3.1 present the results estimated with an establishment fixed effects
model, which controls for time-invariant heterogeneity across establishments.3 In these regres-
sions, high leverage in an establishment in a given year is defined relative to average leverage
2Table 3.1 shows that controlling for past profitability does not change the main results, suggesting that firms with
weak performance prior to distress do not drive worker entrepreneurship. I perform additional tests to address the
concern that economically, and not financially distressed firms, drive employee entrepreneurship in distressed firms.
Following Andrade and Kaplan (1998), I identify firms with negative operating income prior to industry distress as
more likely to be economically weak. I find that the results are not driven by firms with poor performance prior to
industry distress. See Table A.2 in the Appendix for the regression analysis.
3Since each establishment can be located in only one state and very few establishments change industry definition,
the inclusion of establishment fixed effects controls for time-invariant state of location and industry characteristics. I
use establishment fixed effects as opposed to firm fixed effects to control for potential differences in the number of
establishments within a firm across financial distress and non-distress years. The results with firm fixed effects are
similar and are presented in Table A.3 in the Online Appendix.
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within-establishment. Column [4] only includes establishment fixed effects. It shows that rela-
tively high leverage has no effect on worker entrepreneurship after non-distress industry years.
However, it does increase entrepreneurship after industry distress years. The estimate of the in-
teraction term increases to 2% from 1.2% estimated with industry-year fixed effects, potentially
suggesting that firms more exposed to industry shocks might choose lower leverage levels and
that industry-year fixed effects might not fully control for that unobserved heterogeneity. Columns
[5] and [6] control for the possibility that time-variant omitted variables drive changes in leverage
and worker entrepreneurship. The inclusion of these controls has little effect on the estimate of
the financial distress coefficient. Using within-establishment variation, firm characteristics found
important for rates of entrepreneurship in Column [3] are now insignificant, but the coefficient on
firm R&D expenses becomes positive and significant. Given very limited variability in firm-level
R&D expenses, this result needs to be interpreted with caution.
In Columns [7] - [9] of Table 3.1, I add industry-year fixed effects to establishment fixed effects
to address the concern that industry factors drive changes in leverage. In these regressions, the
within-establishment changes in leverage are adjusted for industry-year means. The estimate of
the financial distress coefficient is little changed by adding industry-year fixed effects, remains
statistically significant, and is also similar after the inclusion of state-year fixed effects and the
other time-varying variables considered earlier.
I next look at the pre-shock trend in entrepreneurship in financially distressed firms. In this set-
ting, the difference-in-difference identification strategy requires that relatively more levered firms
do not experience a higher exit rate of workers into entrepreneurship prior to the shock. Table 3.1
shows that, on average, within a given establishment, relatively higher leverage is not positively
related to the exit of workers into start-ups after non-distress industry years. However, a run-up
in entrepreneurship might still occur just prior to the industry shock. If that were the case, then
some yet uncontrolled-for time-variant variable might be driving changes in leverage and worker
exit into start-ups. I verify that relatively more levered firms do not experience a higher exit rate
of workers into entrepreneurship during the period leading up to industry distress. This result
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suggests that no pre-trend exists of worker exit into start-ups.
The results presented in this section show that financial distress increases the quantity of en-
trepreneurs. To show the results graphically, I predict and plot in Figure 3.1 the percentage of
establishment workers who become entrepreneurs after distress vs. non-distress industry years as
a function of leverage estimated from the establishment fixed effects model. The figure highlights
that relatively high leverage has a minimal effect on worker entrepreneurship after non-distress
industry years. However, after industry downturns, relatively higher-leverage firms experience a
higher exodus of workers into entrepreneurship.
Alternative Measures of Worker Entrepreneurship
In this section I summarize several supplemental analyses that test the robustness of the results
to using alternative measures of worker entrepreneurship. I start by exploring whether the results
are sensitive to using a more restrictive definition of entrepreneurship. The main variable defines
any of the top five earners in a start-up as founders, likely mis-classifying some of the first em-
ployees as founders. To proxy for the main founder of the start-up, I re-define only the top earner
in a start-up as the founder. As with the main variable definition, I normalize the number of future
entrepreneurs by pre-distress establishment employment. In Table 3.2, columns [1] - [4] show
that the “main founder” definition produces similar results in terms of statistical and economic
significance, suggesting that the pattern holds for the most important start-up founder.
I also verify that financial distress is followed by an increase in the number of start-ups. If
financial distress encourages co-worker team starts, then the total number of start-ups might not
increase even though the total number of workers moving to start-ups increases. Redefining the
dependent variable as the number of unique start-ups associated with the start-up founders leaving
public firms, normalized by pre-distress employment, yields similar results (Table 3.2, columns [5]
- [8]).
The main definition measures entrepreneurship at a point in time, taking a snapshot of en-
trepreneurs three years after the start of distress. This definition will miss any employee moving to
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a start-up but quitting before the snapshot is taken. Survivorship bias would occur if distress cre-
ates higher-quality entrepreneurs who are more likely to persist in entrepreneurship. Redefining
an entrepreneur as someone who founds a start-up within either one, two, or three years following
distress yields results similar to those obtained using the main definition.
The analysis presented in this section extends the main results by showing that financial distress
spurs new firm creation and increases the supply of firm founders. Since the increase might be due
to higher worker turnover in financially weaker firms, I next analyze the role of overall turnover in
generating the results.
The Role of Worker Turnover in the Increased Rate of Entrepreneurship
The main definition normalizes the number of future entrepreneurs by the pre-distress period
employment to capture the effect of financial distress on the propensity of ex ante employees to
become entrepreneurs. However, if more workers separate from financially distressed firms, then
more workers are likely to become entrepreneurs. With the aim of controlling for turnover directly,
I define two additional variables to determine whether more workers who leave their firms are
more likely to become entrepreneurs. First, I normalize the number of future entrepreneurs by the
number of workers employed by a different firm in the post-distress period, and present the results
in Table 3.3. Second, I normalize the number of future entrepreneurs by the number of workers
who, after three years, work for a different firm or who drop out of the employment sample, and
present the results for this definition in Table A.4 in the Appendix.4 Both alternative definitions
produce very similar estimates in terms of sign and significance, suggesting that financial distress
affects the transition rates of workers specifically to entrepreneurship.
Next, I examine if worker turnover is indeed higher in financially distressed firms. The evidence
on lower employment growth in financially weak firms presented in section 2.2 is consistent with
prior findings (Chodorow-Reich (2014); Giroud and Mueller (2015)); however, existing literature
does not differentiate worker departures from declines in new hires when presenting changes in
4For both definitions, I set the value of the establishment’s future entrepreneurship equal to zero to avoid dropping the
observation in cases where the value is undefined because no workers leave an establishment. The results are similar
in terms of statistical and economic significance if I drop observations with no worker departures.
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employment growth. Negative growth may well be driven by cuts in new hires. To measure the
effect of firm distress on worker turnover, I calculate the percent of workers at each establishment
who stay to work at their current firm for three years (equivalently, for two years following the end
of a potentially distressed year). In the sample, an average of 36% of public firm workers stay with
their employer over a subsequent three-year period, measured from the first quarter of the base year
(the year during which distress is defined). The estimate is consistent with high turnover estimates
in papers that use the LEHD data (Bjelland, Fallick, Haltiwanger, and McEntarfer (2011); Graham
et al. (2015)). Table 3.4, columns [1] – [2], shows that indeed, fewer workers stay with more
financially levered employers following industry shocks.
The departures from distressed firms can be driven by the documented increase in entrepreneurial
separations. Alternatively, workers moving to other established firms or becoming unemployed
might also contribute to the overall increase in turnover. I analyze the different departures in which
the separating workers move to work for firms that existed prior to the shock (variable “Pct Move
Existing”), drop out from the labor sample (“Pct Drop-out”), or move to start-ups (“Pct Move Star-
tups”). Over the same three-year period, 32% of workers leave to work for firms that existed prior
to the base year, 17% of workers drop out from the LEHD employment sample, 3.8% move to work
for start-ups (firms founded since the base year).5 I estimate equation 2.1 with these turnover vari-
ables as the dependent variables and present the results in Table 3.4. The findings do not show that
employees at more levered public firms are significantly more likely to move to other established
firms or drop out from the employment sample following industry shocks. Conversely, workers are
more likely to move to start-ups.
One way to interpret these findings is that, due to firm-specific investments or other labor
market frictions, workers with no aspirations for entrepreneurship stay with the financially weak
employer to wait out the storm, while entrepreneurial workers leave because the opportunity cost
5The remaining 11% of workers leave to work for other firms with unknown age. The LBD is used to determine firm
age. Since not all firms in the LEHD data map to the LBD, the age of some firms is unknown.
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of postponing the development of an entrepreneurial idea is high.6 Another possibility is that
workers who found start-ups are poor performers who are fired by the financially distressed firm.
I cannot observe whether the start-up founders were laid-off, so I turn to examining the quality of
entrepreneurs and the firms they found.
6Results presented in this dissertation do not imply that general worker separations would not increase in more severed
cases of financial distress, such as bankruptcy.
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Figure 3.1: Predicted Entrepreneurship as a Function of Firm Financial Leverage After Distress
vs. Non-Distress Industry Years
This graph shows predicted future worker entrepreneurship as a function of firm financial leverage after distress and
non-distress industry years. The predicted values are plotted along with the corresponding confidence intervals. The
predicted values and their confidence intervals are estimated from the following equation:
yefit+3 = βL × Leverageft−2 + βI × IndDistressit + βFD × Leverageft−2 × IndDistressit + αe + efit
where e indexes establishments, f indexes firm, i indexes industry, t indexes time in years; y is the percent of employees
at the establishment e of the firm f in industry i at time t who become entrepreneurs at t+3; Leverage is the firm book
financial leverage ratio (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, normalized by total firm assets) measured at t-2;
IndDistress is an indicator variable equal to one if the industry-year it is in distress; αe is establishment fixed effects;
and  is the error term. The vertical bar “Mean Leverage” is an average firm leverage across all establishment-years.
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Table 3.1: The Effect of Firm Financial Distress on the Rate of Worker Entrepreneurship
This table presents establishment-level analysis. The sample consists of establishments of U.S. public firms, and
extends from 1990 through 2003. The dependent variable Pct Entrepreneurs is the count of an establishment’s workers
defined as future entrepreneurs two years after the base year (the year during which distress is defined), normalized
by base year establishment employment and expressed in percentage terms; a worker is a future entrepreneur if, two
years after the base year, he works at a start-up (a firm founded during or after the base year) and is also one of the
top five earners at that start-up. IndDistress is an indicator variable equal to one if an industry-year is in distress.
Leverage is the firm book financial leverage ratio (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, normalized by total
firm assets) lagged by two years from the base year. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix A. Note: since
the industry distress indicator is collinear with the industry-year fixed effects, the coefficient on IndDistress cannot be
estimated in columns [1] - [3] and is imprecisely estimated with few observations in columns [7] - [9] and hence is not
reported. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC–3 code industry-level and are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Dependent Variable: Pct Entrepreneurs
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
IndDistress -0.456*** -0.463*** -0.467***
(0.113) (0.123) (0.111)
Leverage 0.336** 0.336** 0.308** -0.235 -0.179 -0.122 -0.219 -0.195 -0.153
(0.154) (0.153) (0.146) (0.191) (0.192) (0.196) (0.200) (0.196) (0.204)
Leverage × IndDistress 1.167** 1.186*** 1.275** 1.939*** 1.952*** 1.957*** 1.846*** 1.851*** 1.857***
(0.459) (0.442) (0.611) (0.541) (0.558) (0.536) (0.571) (0.595) (0.588)
Establishment Size -0.144*** 0.059 0.068
(0.021) (0.060) (0.065)
Establishment Mean Wage -0.061 0.099 0.113
(0.053) (0.094) (0.100)
Firm Age -0.019*** -0.007 -0.013
(0.005) (0.011) (0.014)
Diversified Firm -0.179*** 0.015 0.015
(0.066) (0.125) (0.121)
Firm Sales Growth 0.220*** -0.006 -0.042
(0.067) (0.068) (0.074)
Firm Return on Assets -0.841** -0.104 -0.161
(0.330) (0.279) (0.330)
Firm Investments 0.990** 0.244 0.269
(0.413) (0.271) (0.235)
Firm R&D -0.177 2.784* 2.753*
(0.941) (1.480) (1.526)
Firm Tobin’s Q -0.018 0.100* 0.063
(0.062) (0.060) (0.072)
Firm Size -0.062*** 0.008 0.023
(0.015) (0.044) (0.055)
Firm Asset Tangibility -0.416*** -0.093 -0.159
(0.152) (0.368) (0.391)
Firm Cash 0.001 -0.193 -0.103
(0.267) (0.292) (0.303)
Industry–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.024 0.028 0.035 0.510 0.512 0.512 0.519 0.520 0.520
Number of Observations 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,101
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Table 3.2: The Effect of Firm Financial Distress on the Rate of Worker Entrepreneurship: Alterna-
tive Definitions of Worker Entrepreneurship
This table presents establishment-level analysis. The sample consists of establishments of U.S. public firms, and
extends from 1990 through 2003. The table reports results with alternative definitions of entrepreneurship. Pct Main
Founder is the count of an establishment’s workers who, two years after the base year (the year during which distress
is defined), work at start-ups (a firm founded during or after the base year) and are also the top earners at those start-
ups, normalized by base year establishment employment and expressed in percentage terms. Pct Startups is the count
of unique start-ups associated with future entrepreneurs defined according to the main definition, normalized by base
year establishment employment and expressed in percentage terms; a worker is a future entrepreneur if, two years after
the base year, he works at a start-up and is also one of the top five earners at that start-up. IndDistress is an indicator
variable equal to one if an industry-year is in distress. Leverage is the firm book financial leverage ratio (long-term debt
plus debt in current liabilities, normalized by total firm assets) lagged by two years from the base year. Establishment
controls include establishment size and average worker wage. Firm controls are firm age, diversification, and the
following financial variables lagged by one year: sales growth, return on assets, investments, R&D expenses, Tobin’s
Q, firm size, asset tangibility, and cash holdings. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix A. Standard errors
are clustered at the SIC–3 code industry-level and are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels.
Dependent Variable: Pct Main Founder Pct Startups
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
IndDistress -0.227*** -0.233*** -0.360*** -0.363***
(0.073) (0.070) (0.091) (0.085)
Leverage -0.039 -0.022 -0.057 -0.051 -0.126 -0.082 -0.126 -0.098
(0.095) (0.100) (0.102) (0.109) (0.156) (0.162) (0.158) (0.166)
Leverage × IndDistress 0.965*** 0.972*** 1.056*** 1.057*** 1.379*** 1.382*** 1.190*** 1.196***
(0.281) (0.273) (0.321) (0.319) (0.357) (0.356) (0.330) (0.326)
Industry–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.492 0.493 0.502 0.502 0.470 0.470 0.478 0.478
Number of Observations 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100
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Table 3.3: The Effect of Firm Financial Distress on the Rate of Entrepreneurship Among Departing
Workers
This table presents establishment-level analysis. The sample consists of establishments of U.S. public firms, and
extends from 1990 through 2003. The table reports the results with alternative normalization of future entrepreneurs.
The dependent variable Pct Entrepreneurs/Change Employer is the count of an establishment’s workers defined as
future entrepreneurs two years after the base year (the year during which distress is defined), normalized by the number
of the establishment’s employees who work for a different employer two years after the base year, and expressed in
percentage terms; a worker is a future entrepreneur if, two years after the base year, he works at a start-up (a firm
founded during or after the base year) and is also one of the top five earners at that start-up. IndDistress is an indicator
variable equal to one if an industry-year is in distress. Leverage is the firm book financial leverage ratio (long-term debt
plus debt in current liabilities, normalized by total firm assets) lagged by two years from the base year. Establishment
controls include establishment size and average worker wage. Firm controls are firm age, diversification, and the
following financial variables lagged by one year: sales growth, return on assets, investments, R&D expenses, Tobin’s
Q, firm size, asset tangibility, and cash holdings. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix A. Standard errors
are clustered at the SIC–3 code industry-level and are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels.
Dependent Variable: Pct Entrepreneurs/Change Employer
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
IndDistress -1.312** -1.308***
(0.509) (0.456)
Leverage 0.256 0.375 -0.540 -0.391 -0.545 -0.450
(0.309) (0.266) (0.471) (0.491) (0.488) (0.516)
Leverage × IndDistress 3.508*** 3.885*** 4.567** 4.541** 4.644** 4.651**
(1.026) (1.396) (2.089) (1.983) (2.210) (2.154)
Industry–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.027 0.030 0.455 0.455 0.465 0.466
Number of Observations 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100
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Table 3.4: Worker Turnover in Financially Distressed Firms
This table presents establishment-level analysis. Pct Stay is the percent of an establishment’s workers who, two years
after the base year (the year during which distress is defined), still work at the firm. Pct Move Existing is the percent
of an establishment’s workers who, two years after the base year, work at a different firm that existed prior to the base
year. Pct Drop-out is the percent of an establishment’s workers who, two years after the base year, are not observed
in the employment sample. Pct Move Startups is the percent of the establishment’s workers who, two years after the
base year, work at start-ups (a firm founded during or after the base year). IndDistress is an indicator variable equal
to one if an industry-year is in distress. Leverage is the firm book financial leverage ratio (long-term debt plus debt
in current liabilities, normalized by total firm assets) lagged by two years from the base year. Establishment controls
include establishment size and average worker wage. Firm controls are firm age, diversification, and the following
financial variables lagged by one year: sales growth, return on assets, investments, R&D expenses, Tobin’s Q, firm
size, asset tangibility, and cash holdings. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix A. The sample consists of
establishments of U.S. public firms, and extends from 1990 through 2003. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC–3
code industry-level and are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Dependent Variable: Pct Stay Pct Move Existing Pct Drop-out Pct Move Startups
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Leverage 0.549 0.342 0.911 1.047 -0.598 -0.571 -0.371 -0.231
(1.180) (1.208) (1.063) (1.108) (0.484) (0.502) (0.381) (0.372)
Leverage × IndDistress -7.541* -7.516* 4.586 4.524 0.264 0.264 2.458*** 2.450***
(4.276) (4.302) (3.699) (3.538) (1.612) (1.662) (0.816) (0.792)
Industry–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.794 0.795 0.737 0.739 0.609 0.610 0.577 0.577
Number of Observations 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100
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3.2 The Effect of Financial Distress on the Quality of Entrepreneurship
In the previous section, I documented that firm financial distress increases the quantity of en-
trepreneurs. In this section, I explore whether that increase is driven by high- or low-quality work-
ers. Layoffs are more common among lower-quality workers (Gibbons and Katz (1991)), while
start-ups of laid-off workers are less likely to create jobs or survive (Parker (2009); Pfeiffer and
Reize (2000)). Thus, we might observe a decline in the average quality of entrepreneurs and the
firms they found, if the increase is driven by laid-off workers. Understanding the type of en-
trepreneurs spurred by financial distress helps to shed light on economic mechanisms responsible
for the results and assess implications of the increase in entrepreneurship triggered by financial
distress.
The Effect of Firm Financial Distress on the Quality of Entrepreneurs
The LEHD database contains worker earnings histories at each firm and thereby provides an
opportunity to gauge the quality of entrepreneurs created by financial distress. Existing literature
has documented that, prior to exiting paid employment, workers who become entrepreneurs earn
more than other workers (Hamilton (2000); Giannetti and Simonov (2009)). Controlling for indus-
try, location, worker, establishment, and firm characteristics, I confirm that, prior to exiting paid
employment, the average earnings for entrepreneurs in my sample exceed those of other workers
within a given establishment. Thus, using earning as a proxy for worker quality, entrepreneurs
appear to be higher quality than their co-workers.
To assess the quality of entrepreneurs created after financial distress relative to other workers
within an establishment, I separately count future entrepreneurs within sub-samples of employees
in the top and bottom halves of an establishment’s wage distributions and repeat the main analysis
from Table 3.1. I present the results for the top (bottom) half of wage distribution in Table 3.5,
Panel A (Panel B). Table 3.5 shows that the sensitivity of entrepreneurship rate to financial distress
is more pronounced among the top half of wage earners, suggesting that entrepreneurship spawned
by financial distress is not driven by lower-quality workers within a firm.
I next focus on the sample of entrepreneurs and analyze whether the quality of entrepreneurs
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depends on the degree of financial distress of spawning firms. I retrieve wages earned prior to
exiting paid employment to proxy for worker quality and wages earned after joining start-ups to
proxy for quality in entrepreneurship. I define ex ante earnings as the natural logarithm of the real
wages earned at a public firm during the quarter the worker is identified with that firm. I define
ex post earnings as the natural logarithm of total, three-year, real wages earned from the time an
employee is identified as a start-up founder.7 I also measure future worker wage growth as the
log-difference between ex post and ex ante wages.8
Summary statistics on entrepreneur wages and other personal characteristics are in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6 shows that workers founding start-ups following industry distress years do not differ
significantly by proxies of risk aversion (such as gender and age), by tenure at a public firm, or
by earnings. I next turn to multivariate analysis to determine if earnings of workers exiting after
industry shocks are correlated with the leverage of spawning firms.
As a relatively rare event, entrepreneurship provides limited variation for within-establishment
difference-in-difference comparisons. I use an industry-year fixed effects regression specification,
with the caveat that the results should be interpreted as comparing entrepreneurs from more- vs.
less-levered firms within a given industry-year cell.
In particular, I estimate the following model at the entrepreneur level:
ywefist = βL × Leverageft−2 + βFD × Leverageft−2 × IndDistressit
+ αit + αis + γ
′Xwefist + wefist
(3.1)
where w indexes workers and all other indices are as defined in equation 2.1, y is the dependent
7For example, for the employee identified at a public firm in the first quarter of 1998 who left and was identified as a
start-up founder in the first quarter of 2001, I take a natural logarithm of the total real earnings over 2001, 2002, and
2003. I do not restrict earnings to those derived from the start-up because that would require the start-up’s conditional
survival for at least three years. Studying the performance of survivors may yield interesting data, but a more general
question concerns the future performance of all entrepreneurs.
8To measure worker wage growth, I calculate the ex ante wages in a manner similar to that of the ex post wages for
consistency. For example, for an employee working for a public firm in the first quarter of 1998, I calculate ex ante
wages as a natural logarithm of the total real earnings over 1995, 1996 and 1997.
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variable of interest (ex ante or ex post real earnings of worker w identified at establishment e in
industry i of firm f in state s and at time t), and αit and αis are industry-year and state-year fixed
effects, respectively. X is a vector of firm and establishment control variables included in the
main analysis, as well as worker-level control variables. Since the industry distress indicator is
collinear with the industry-year fixed effects, the coefficient on IndDistress cannot be estimated in
this specification.
Columns [1] and [2] of Table 3.8 present the results on ex ante earnings. Column [1] includes
worker-level controls. Column [2] adds establishment- and firm-level controls.9 Financial lever-
age is not correlated with earnings of workers who found start-ups following non-distress industry
years. However, among workers who become entrepreneurs following industry downturns, en-
trepreneurs who exit from more financially levered firms earn higher wages prior to exit than those
who leave less levered firms. When all controls are included, a one standard deviation in leverage
is associated with 10% higher earnings.
Columns [3] - [4] ([5] - [6]) present the results on ex post earnings (earnings growth). Col-
umn [3] ([5]) includes worker-level controls; column [4] ([6]) adds establishment- and firm-level
controls. Similar to the results on ex ante earnings, financial leverage is not correlated with either
earnings or earnings growth of workers who found start-ups following non-distress industry years.
Both future earnings and earnings growth are positively associated with ex ante firm leverage for
workers transitioning into entrepreneurship after industry distress years.
The earnings results suggest that workers who transition into entrepreneurship due to financial
distress are not necessarily bad workers. On the contrary, the entrepreneurs from financially dis-
tressed firms are on average better, making it less likely that mechanisms by which low-quality
workers found new employer firms explain the main results.
The Effect of Firm Financial Distress on the Quality of Startups
If, indeed, financial distress propels better workers into entrepreneurship, then the performance
9Worker-level controls include worker age, age squared, female indicator, race indicator (equal to one if white), worker
education (years of education, which is imputed in the LEHD data), foreign born indicator, born in state indicator,
total experience (number of years in the LEHD data), and tenure (number of years at the establishment).
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of their start-ups likely depends on the degree of financial distress as well. I test whether future
start-up employment growth depends on the financial distress of the spawning firm. I also examine
start-up survival as another dimension of start-up performance.
I start by selecting all start-ups associated with the employee-entrepreneurs studied in the pre-
vious section. I use the LBD to estimate long-term survival and growth and define an indicator
variable as equal to one if the start-up exits within five years. I retrieve start-ups’ employment five
years after it is identified with the entrepreneur. In the case where a start-up exits, I set natural log-
arithm of future employment to zero. I measure future employment growth as the log-differences
between the future and initial employments. To gauge a start-up’s business relatedness to the
spawning establishment, I create an indicator variable equal to one when an SIC–2 industry of the
start-up and the spawning establishment is the same.
Table 3.7 contains summary statistics. On average, start-ups are 1.6 years old when they are
identified with the worker previously employed by a public firm. Only 17% of all start-ups are in
the same industry as the spawning establishment. Startups spawned after industry distress are more
likely to be in a different industry from the spawning establishment’s industry, compared to startups
spawned after non-distress periods. However, this result is not significant in a univariate analysis.
On average, start-ups founded following industry distress years have slightly lower employment in
the first year of their operation, but they are not more likely to exit within five years. Consistent
with prior literature, about 50% of start-ups survive for five years (Robb and Reedy (2012)). How-
ever, univariate analysis shows that start-ups founded following industry distress years have 5.6%
lower future employment growth. I next test in a multivariate setting how survival and growth
of start-ups founded following industry distress years are associated the financial leverage of the
spawning firms.
As with the entrepreneur-level analysis, I estimate an industry-year fixed effects regression
specification at the start-up – entrepreneur pair level. Columns [1] and [2] of Table 3.9 present
analysis of start-up survival as a function of financial distress estimated with a linear probability
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model.10
Column [1] presents coefficients estimated while controlling for worker and start-up character-
istics. Column [2] also adds firm- and establishment-level control variables. Startup exit is nega-
tively correlated with financial distress, as the interaction term between ex ante financial leverage
and industry distress is negative, but the result becomes insignificant when all controls are included.
Future start-up employment (in columns [3] - [4]) and employment growth (in columns [5] -
[6]) are both significantly positively correlated with the degree of financial distress of the spawning
public firms. The interaction between ex ante financial leverage and industry distress remains stable
when I include firm, establishment, worker, and startup-level control variables. A one standard
deviation increase in ex ante leverage is associated with 3.4% higher five-year employment growth
of start-ups founded by workers after an industry shock.
Since little is generally known about how characteristics of spawning firms correlate with
the performance of start-ups, I highlight some interesting correlations from Table 3.9. Startups
founded by higher-wage workers experience a lower exit rate and a higher future growth rate. Also
intuitive is that workers who come from high R&D firms found riskier start-ups with a higher
exit rate. What is less expected is that start-ups of workers from financially distressed firms grow
faster, but are not riskier as measured by exit rate. This finding runs counter to the expectation
that high-growth start-ups should also exhibit high risk profiles, such as the ones founded by the
employees from high R&D firms. Also notable: when a founder’s ex ante wages are included as a
control variable, the estimates of the start-up growth rate do not fall, suggesting that the start-ups
founded by workers from financially distressed firms have some other edge over other start-ups
besides founder ability. I will analyze potential mechanisms underlying the results in section 4.
10I use linear probability model because my coefficient of interest is an interaction, which cannot be interpreted as
marginal effects in logit or probit models due to non-linearity. I verify that the sign and significance of the interaction
coefficient between financial leverage and industry distress is similar if estimated with the logit model.
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Table 3.5: The Effect of Firm Financial Distress on the Rate of Entrepreneurship Within the Top
Half and the Bottom Half of Wage Earners
This table presents establishment-level analysis. The sample consists of establishments of U.S. public firms, and
extends from 1990 through 2003. Panel A (Panel B) presents the results using workers within the top (bottom) half
of the earnings distribution within an establishment-year. In both panels, the dependent variable is Pct Entrepreneurs,
which is calculated within each respective earnings group. Pct Entrepreneurs is the count of an establishment’s workers
defined as future entrepreneurs two years after the base year (the year during which distress is defined), normalized
by base year establishment employment and expressed in percentage terms; a worker is a future entrepreneur if, two
years after the base year, he works at a start-up (a firm founded during or after the base year) and is also one of the
top five earners at that start-up. IndDistress is an indicator variable equal to one if an industry-year is in distress.
Leverage is the firm book financial leverage ratio (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, normalized by total
firm assets) lagged by two years from the base year. Establishment controls include establishment size and average
worker wage. Firm controls are firm age, diversification, and the following financial variables lagged by one year:
sales growth, return on assets, investments, R&D expenses, Tobin’s Q, firm size, asset tangibility, and cash holdings.
Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC–3 code industry-level and
are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Panel A: Workers in the Top Half of an Establishment Wage Distribution
Dependent Variable: Pct Entrepreneurs
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
IndDistress -0.456** -0.469**
(0.205) (0.185)
Leverage 0.455** 0.408** -0.110 -0.011 -0.134 -0.045
(0.176) (0.167) (0.258) (0.259) (0.266) (0.271)
Leverage × IndDistress 1.576*** 1.685*** 2.313** 2.318** 2.117** 2.107**
(0.495) (0.642) (0.924) (0.892) (0.856) (0.831)
Industry–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.028 0.034 0.527 0.527 0.536 0.536
Number of Observations 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100
Panel B: Workers in the Bottom Half of an Establishment Wage Distribution
Dependent Variable: Pct Entrepreneurs
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
IndDistress -0.459*** -0.452***
(0.125) (0.123)
Leverage 0.230 0.227 -0.294 -0.282 -0.316 -0.319
(0.156) (0.150) (0.212) (0.221) (0.233) (0.243)
Leverage × IndDistress 0.843 0.908 1.680*** 1.682*** 1.638** 1.658**
(0.661) (0.807) (0.563) (0.553) (0.712) (0.719)
Industry–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.021 0.024 0.428 0.428 0.435 0.436
Number of Observations 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100
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Table 3.6: Summary Statistics: Workers Who Become Entrepreneurs
This table presents statistics on worker-level variables. The sample consists of workers who found new firms after
exiting establishments of U.S. public firms from 1990 through 2003. “All” refers to all observations in the sample.
“Not Industry Distress” refers to workers who found new firms after leaving public firms in non-distressed industry-
years. “Industry Distress” refers to workers who found new firms after leaving public firms in distressed industry-years.
In columns [1] - [3], sample means (standard deviations) are computed across all observations. Column [4] provides
differences in means. Worker Age is measured in years. Worker Female is an indicator variable equal to one if female.
Worker Education is the number of years of a worker education. Worker Tenure is the number of years a worker is at
the establishment of a public firm. Worker Ex Ante Earnings is the natural logarithm of real wages earned at a public
firm during the quarter the worker is identified with that firm. Worker Ex Post Earnings is the natural logarithm of
total three-year real wages earned since the worker became identified as an entrepreneur. Worker Earnings Growth is
the log-difference between ex post and ex ante earnings. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix A. Standard
errors are clustered at the SIC–3 industry code. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
All Not Industry Industry Difference
Distress Distress ([3] - [2])
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Worker Age 32.195 32.116 33.585 1.468
(11.180) (11.181) (11.073)
Worker Female 0.462 0.464 0.424 -0.039
(0.499) (0.499) (0.494)
Worker Education 13.221 13.218 13.268 0.050
(2.430) (2.430) (2.432)
Worker Tenure 1.495 1.508 1.264 -0.244
(1.766) (1.773) (1.637)
Worker Ex Ante Earnings 9.391 9.408 9.093 -0.315
(1.606) (1.591) (1.836)
Worker Ex Post Earnings 9.881 9.887 9.790 -0.096
(1.141) (1.138) (1.189)
Worker Earnings Growth 0.047 0.053 -0.058 -0.111
(1.282) (1.281) (1.289)
Number of Observations 315,200 298,179 17,021
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Table 3.7: Summary Statistics: Startups Founded by Former Workers
This table presents statistics on start-up variables. The sample consists of start-ups founded by workers who exit
establishments of U.S. public firms from 1990 through 2003. “All” refers to all observations in the sample. “Not
Industry Distress” refers to new firms founded by workers leaving public firms not in industry distress years. “Industry
Distress” refers to new firms founded by workers leaving public firms in industry distress years In columns [1] - [3],
sample means (standard deviations) are computed across all observations. Column [4] provides differences in means.
Startup Age at Joining is the start-up age in years during the year it is identified with the entrepreneur, taking values
from one to three, inclusively. Startup Same Ind is an indicator variable equal to one if an SIC–2 industry of the start-
up and the spawning establishment is the same. Startup Initial Empl is the natural logarithm of start-up employment
plus one in the first year of the start-up’s existence. Startup Exit is an indicator variable equal to one if a start-up
exits by the fifth year since it became identified with the entrepreneur. Startup Future Empl is the natural logarithm of
start-up employment plus one in five years since it became identified with the entrepreneur. Startup Empl Growth is
the log-difference between start-up future and initial employments. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix
A. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC–3 industry code. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels.
All Not Industry Industry Difference
Distress Distress ([3] - [2])
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Startup Age at Joining 1.609 1.611 1.569 -0.042∗∗∗
(1.008) (1.007) (1.020)
Startup Same Ind 0.171 0.173 0.131 -0.042
(0.376) (0.378) (0.337)
Startup Initial Empl 0.185 0.186 0.169 -0.017∗∗
(0.618) (0.620) (0.566)
Startup Exit 0.482 0.482 0.487 0.005
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Startup Future Empl 1.078 1.082 1.014 -0.068∗∗∗
(1.306) (1.309) (1.255)
Startup Empl Growth 0.987 0.990 0.933 -0.056∗∗∗
(1.267) (1.269) (1.225)
Number of Observations 315,200 298,179 17,021
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Table 3.8: The Effect of Firm Financial Distress on the Quality of Entrepreneurs
This table presents entrepreneur-level analysis. The sample consists of workers who found new firms after exiting
establishments of U.S. public firms from 1990 through 2003. Worker Ex Ante Earnings is the natural logarithm of real
wages earned at a public firm during the quarter the worker is identified with that firm. Worker Ex Post Earnings is the
natural logarithm of total three-year real wages earned since the worker became identified as an entrepreneur. Worker
Earnings Growth is the log-difference between ex post and ex ante earnings. Worker-level control variables include
worker age, worker age squared, female indicator, white indicator, worker foreign born indicator, worker in-state born
indicator, worker education, worker total experience, and worker tenure. Table A.7 in the Appendix provides estimates
of the coefficients on worker control variables. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix A. Standard errors
are clustered at the SIC–3 code industry-level and are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels.
Dependent Variable: Worker Ex Ante Earnings Worker Ex Post Earnings Worker Earnings Growth
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Leverage 0.056 0.038 -0.032 -0.037 -0.033 -0.041*
(0.094) (0.029) (0.032) (0.025) (0.031) (0.024)
Leverage × IndDistress 0.862** 0.481*** 0.225** 0.139** 0.241** 0.151**
(0.413) (0.088) (0.110) (0.059) (0.108) (0.061)
Establishment Size -0.063*** -0.034*** -0.033***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Establishment Mean Wage (Excl. Worker) 0.869*** 0.147*** 0.144***
(0.078) (0.030) (0.030)
Firm Age 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Diversified Firm -0.059* -0.045*** -0.049***
(0.034) (0.017) (0.018)
Firm Sales Growth 0.091*** -0.018** -0.018**
(0.025) (0.009) (0.008)
Firm Return on Assets -0.090 -0.097* -0.103*
(0.067) (0.054) (0.054)
Firm Investments 0.133* 0.240*** 0.240***
(0.077) (0.070) (0.071)
Firm R&D -0.084 0.168 0.068
(0.161) (0.262) (0.269)
Firm Tobin’s Q 0.010 0.004 0.006
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Firm Size 0.001 -0.005 -0.005
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Firm Asset Tangibility -0.074 -0.080* -0.075*
(0.062) (0.041) (0.039)
Firm Cash 0.005 -0.029 -0.049
(0.077) (0.044) (0.056)
Industry–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker Ex Ante Earnings Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.410 0.458 0.231 0.235 0.393 0.396
Number of Observations 315,200 315,200 315,200 315,200 315,200 315,200
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Table 3.9: The Effect of Firm Financial Distress on the Quality of Startups
This table presents startup-level analysis. The sample consists of start-ups founded by workers who exit establishments
of U.S. public firms from 1990 through 2003. Startup Exit is an indicator variable equal to one if a start-up exits by
the fifth year since it became identified with the entrepreneur. Startup Future Empl is the natural logarithm of start-
up employment plus one in five years since it became identified with the entrepreneur. Startup Empl Growth is
the log-difference between start-up future and initial employments. Establishment- and firm-level control variables
are measured at a public firm level. Worker-level control variables include worker age, worker age squared, female
indicator, white indicator, worker foreign born indicator, worker in-state born indicator, worker education, worker total
experience, and worker tenure. Startup-level control variables include startup age at the time it became identified with
the entrepreneur and startup initial employment. Table A.8 in the Appendix provides estimates of the coefficients
on worker and start-up control variables. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix A. Standard errors are
clustered at the SIC–3 code industry-level and are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels.
Dependent Variable: Startup Exit Startup Future Empl Startup Empl Growth
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Leverage 0.006 0.011 0.023 0.007 0.026 0.012
(0.006) (0.007) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Leverage × IndDistress -0.052** -0.039 0.198*** 0.166** 0.172*** 0.143**
(0.024) (0.025) (0.064) (0.067) (0.062) (0.064)
Worker Ex Ante Earnings -0.013*** -0.012*** 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.083*** 0.084***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Establishment Size 0.002* -0.016*** -0.015***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Establishment Mean Wage (Excl. Worker) -0.010*** -0.015 -0.019
(0.003) (0.014) (0.013)
Firm Age -0.001*** 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Diversified Firm -0.001 -0.002 0.001
(0.007) (0.020) (0.019)
Firm Sales Growth -0.007 0.023 0.029**
(0.006) (0.015) (0.013)
Firm Return on Assets 0.011 -0.078* -0.077*
(0.015) (0.044) (0.045)
Firm Investments 0.027* 0.047 0.057
(0.016) (0.055) (0.056)
Firm R&D 0.165*** -0.043 -0.000
(0.051) (0.204) (0.189)
Firm Tobin’s Q -0.001 -0.005 -0.006
(0.003) (0.011) (0.011)
Firm Size 0.003*** -0.006** -0.005**
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Firm Asset Tangibility -0.006 -0.037 -0.034
(0.009) (0.024) (0.024)
Firm Cash 0.002 -0.049 -0.046
(0.023) (0.060) (0.052)
Industry–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Startup Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.021 0.022 0.038 0.038 0.075 0.076
Number of Observations 315,200 315,200 315,200 315,200 315,200 315,200
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3.3 Robustness Checks and Interpretation
In this section I summarize several supplemental analyses that test the robustness of the results
and interpretation. One potential explanation of the results is that new firms are sales of estab-
lishments from distressed firms to former employees or firm-initiated spin-offs. This explanation
is unlikely to drive the results. First, the definition of a new firm controls for the possibility of a
transfer from one entity to another; only newly-created establishments are defined as firm births.
Second, when I exclude establishments from which more than 50% of employees move to start-
ups, I get similar results (see Table A.5 in the Appendix).
The sample is not restricted to stand-alone firms because few public firms have establishments
in only one industry (see Table 2.1). Thus, one possible interpretation is that establishments in
industries that represent a small percentage of total firm employment might disproportionally affect
the results, possibly because firms in distress are more likely to reduce activity in economically
small industries. When industries that represent less than 10% of firm employment are excluded,
the results are unchanged (see Table A.5 in the Appendix).
I explore whether the main results are sensitive to using alternative definitions of financial
leverage. I use book rather than market leverage ratio to avoid potential negative bias associated
with the firm market equity forecasting low investment opportunities (see section 2 for the discus-
sion). When the two-year lagged market financial leverage is used, I indeed obtain lower but still
significant estimates of the interaction between ex ante leverage and industry distress (see Table
A.6 in the Appendix). Additionally, the book leverage is redefined as long-term debt over book
assets, excluding current liabilities from the numerator. This might be a better definition of finan-
cial leverage if a firm’s decision to refinance debt in current liabilities depended on the perception
of investment opportunities. The results are similar to the main results and are in Table A.6 in the
Appendix.
I also verify that the results are driven by firms that have relatively high interest payments.
Redefining financial leverage as two-year lagged interest expense normalized by two-year lagged
assets or sales yields similar results. That stability suggests that when hit by a shock, firms with
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relatively high interest expense obligations are more affected because they have to allocate a greater
share of their sparse cash flows to paying debt holders. Additionally, the main results are robust
to using net financial leverage ratio, which is adjusted for cash and short-term securities, implying
that more levered firms that hoard cash in anticipation of a shock are unlikely to drive higher
entrepreneurship following shocks (see Table A.6 in the Appendix).
3.4 External Validity
In this section, I discuss the generalization of the results presented in this dissertation. The
sample consists of public firms. Given that most firms are private, one might question whether
the results extend to a broader set of firms. By excluding private firms, my estimates likely under-
estimate the extent of employee entrepreneurship in financially distressed firms. Public firms are
likely to have lower costs of financial distress because they have better access to capital and because
private firms are more financially levered than public firms (Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist
(2011); Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2013)). Additionally, most young firms are private and re-
cent evidence on the capital structure of young firms suggests that they are relatively more levered
than public firms. Robb and Robinson (2014) report that an average leverage ratio of start-ups is
around 50% (personal debt plus business debt over total capital), twice that of public firms in the
sample (average book and market leverage ratios are 25.5% and 24%, respectively), suggesting
that younger firms might be more vulnerable to economic shocks and therefore less able to retain
entrepreneurial employees.
Another potential difficulty in generalizing the results is a concern that they are driven by high
tech firms that were most affected by the dot–com bubble, the timing of which overlaps with the
data used in this study. While high tech firms are probably more likely to experience employee
entrepreneurship during financial distress due to higher growth opportunities, high tech firms are
also less likely to use debt in their capital structure. Nevertheless, when I split industries into
high tech vs. non-high tech following the definition in Ouimet and Zarutskie (2014), and do triple
difference estimation using equation 4.1, I find the effect in non-tech industries as well (see Table
A.10 in the Appendix for the regression results). Additionally, cross-sectional tests show that
43
workers also exit older distressed firms to found start-ups, suggesting that firms that went public
because of the bubble are not the main drivers of the results. In summary, the evidence suggests
that tech-bubble firms are less likely to be the main driver of the results.
To identify financial distress this dissertation relies on episodes of industry declines. Employ-
ment opportunities with existing firms are likely to be sparse during these periods, potentially
making the entrepreneurship option relatively more attractive. However, the lack of employment
opportunities during industry distress cannot fully explain higher worker entrepreneurship in fi-
nancially distressed firms. First, I directly control for employment opportunities by including
industry-year fixed effects. Second, contrary to this argument, following industry distress, workers
are not more likely to move to start-ups (coefficient on IndDistress is zero for an average leverage
firm, when I use any of my entrepreneurship variables as a dependent variable).
The coverage of the LEHD data used in this study extends to only 25 states. This incomplete
coverage likely works against finding the results, especially since the sample excludes the most
entrepreneurial states such as California and Massachusetts (Gompers et al. (2005)). Another
concern with the incomplete coverage is that some workers in a sample might drop out because
they move to a non-covered state. I believe this does not introduce a bias in the measurement of
entrepreneurship during financial distress. First, the results are robust to normalizing the number
of entrepreneurs by the total number of workers who leave the company. Second, the results do
not change when I include state-year fixed effects, making it less likely that the financial distress
of firms is geographically concentrated and correlated with worker movement in and out of state.
Lastly, since the LBD covers only employer firms and does not include Schedule C self-
employed activity, the analysis is limited to the formation of employer firms. As such, the com-
mencement of Schedule C self-employed activity is unmeasured and is not considered to be en-
trepreneurship in this sample. However, I do not find that workers are more likely to drop out from
the employer firms sample following firm distress, suggesting that the self-employed group does
not increase.
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CHAPTER 4: POTENTIAL CHANNELS
The empirical findings so far illustrate that during industry downturns, firm financial leverage
affects the rate and the quality of entrepreneurial spawning. Following periods of firm financial
distress, more workers exit to found new firms, entrepreneurs from financially distressed firms are
high-quality workers, and their start-ups have high future employment growth.
This section discusses potential explanations for the findings. During economic shocks, fi-
nancial leverage can exacerbate many frictions; therefore, multiple and non-mutually exclusive
potential stories can arise. I first present a hypothesis relying on a positive selection of workers
into entrepreneurship and provide empirical evidence aimed at testing this story. I next discuss
several other hypotheses, followed by the discussion.
4.1 Hypotheses
Brain Drain Hypothesis
This hypothesis is based on incomplete contracting literature (Grossman and Hart (1986); Hart
and Moore (1990); Berk et al. (2010)). While using debt financing might be optimal ex ante, given
tax and other benefits of debt, having debt makes contracting more difficult during a negative
shock. Workers might not want to deal with a financially weak firm, since such a firm provides
lower job security and has poor incentives to honor contracts (Titman (1984); Maksimovic and
Titman (1991)). During shocks, relatively more levered firms might also face tighter financing
constraints and be less able to obtain external funding to alleviate contracting difficulties. Higher-
quality workers with good ideas for new products or services might be unwilling to develop them
within the financially distressed firm and be particularly inclined to leave, causing a “brain drain”
(Lucas (1978)).
The Census data do not include information about workers’ motivations for starting a firm;
I can therefore test this story only indirectly. The results of my entrepreneur and start-up quality
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analyses are consistent with this hypothesis. However, this hypothesis also relies on the assumption
that firms in financial distress do not have ex ante contractual means to discourage their workers
from starting competing new firms. I verify that this assumption is relevant since, following in-
dustry distress, the entrepreneurs from more financially levered firms are not more likely to switch
industries.1
One of the standard ways for firms to hold onto employees is through non-compete agreements,
which place constraints on the employees’ post-separation freedom. In particular, by signing these
agreements, employees are contractually restricted from joining or establishing a competing firm
for a specified period of time, usually two to three years. Firms use non-compete agreements to
protect their proprietary knowledge or technology, client lists, and other intangible assets from
being used by the departed workers. Non-compete agreements are commonplace in employment
contracts and are particularly relevant for high human capital workers. Since an employer can sue a
former employee for pursuing related economic activity, these contracts raise workers’ opportunity
cost of leaving the employer. Using a random sample of 500 Execucomp firms, Garmaise (2009)
estimates that at least 70% of firms use non-compete agreements with their top executives. This
estimate is consistent with the frequency of non-compete provisions in contracts with entrepreneurs
(Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2003)) and technology workers (Jauhiainen, Heilmann, and Hurmelinna
(2003)).
While non-compete agreements are commonplace in all U.S. states, significant inter-state vari-
ation exists in the degree of their enforcement. For example, such agreements are void in California
but are very strictly enforced in Florida. The degree to which they are enforced was found to re-
strict worker movement across firms (Fallick, Fleischman, and Rebitzer (2006); Marx, Strumsky,
and Fleming (2009); Marx (2011); Garmaise (2009)) and deter workers from entrepreneurial activ-
ity (Samila and Sorenson (2011); Marx (2011)). Thus, if a financially distressed employer is less
1I estimate Equation 3.1, where the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if an SIC–2 industry of the
start-up and the spawning establishment is the same (variable “Startup Same Ind”). The results are in Table A.9 in
the Appendix. While the coefficient on leverage is positive and significant, the interaction term between firm leverage
and industry distress is not significant. The results are similar if I use the SIC-1 or SIC-3 industry level.
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able to enforce these ex ante contracts, then workers are more likely to leave to found start-ups.
I test whether worker-entrepreneurship in financially distressed firms is higher in states that
less strictly enforce these contracts. I obtain data on the enforceability of non-compete agreements
from Garmaise (2009), who constructs a Noncompetition Enforceability Index for states from 1992
to 2004.2 The index ranges from 0 for states that do not enforce the agreements, to 9 for states
that enforce the agreements the most. I define an indicator variable, Low Enforceability Non-
Competes, as equal to one for establishments in states whose index value is less than 5, the median
value of the index. A second indicator variable, High Enforceability Non-Competes, is defined as
equal to one for establishments in states whose index value is 5 and above. Using the median value
splits observations into two roughly equal groups (57.5% in high enforceability and 42.5% in low
enforceability).3 I estimate the following model at the establishment level:
yefist+3 = βI × IndDistressit + βL × Leverageft−2 + αie + αst
+ βLowFD × Leverageft−2 × IndDistressit × Low + γ′Xefist
+ βHighFD × Leverageft−2 × IndDistressit ×High+ efist
(4.1)
All variables are as defined in Equation 2.1 with the exception of αie, which is industry-year
and/or establishment fixed effects, and High (Low), which is High (Low) Enforceability Non-
Competes indicator variable. In addition to other control variables used in the main specification,
X now also includes High (indicator variable High Enforceability Non-Competes) and interac-
tions of High with leverage and industry distress.
I present the results in Table 4.1. I find that the worker entrepreneurship in financially distressed
firms is driven by establishments in states that less strictly enforce non-compete agreements. The
estimate of βhigh is higher than that of βlow in every specification, and the difference between βhigh
and βlow is statistically significant. The evidence suggests that when financially weak firms are
2For 1990 and 1991, I back-fill the values of the index from 1992.
3Changing the threshold by one (High Enforceability Non-Competes equal to one for values of 6 and above) makes
the difference between high and low enforceability states more pronounced.
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less able to use ex ante contractual means to discourage their workers from starting competing new
firms, worker exit to found new firms accelerates.
Another assumption underlying this story is that firms in financial distress are less able to access
external capital markets during negative shocks, and to obtain funds to retain workers. Thus, I look
at a subset of firms that are particularly likely to have limited access to external capital and that face
tighter financing constraints. One of the most important determinants of financial constraints is the
degree of information asymmetry between a firm and the capital market (Leland and Pyle (1977);
Myers and Majluf (1984)). Bigger and older, more established firms are likely to be characterized
by a lower degree of information asymmetry and lower costs of external financing (Hadlock and
Pierce (2010); Li (2011)). Thus, I identify smaller and younger firms as likely to face greater
financial constraints.
I use total firm assets as a proxy for firm size and age as a public firm to measure the length of
the relationship with capital markets. For firm size, I sort firms each year into two groups based
on the median value of one-year lagged assets: firms with expected higher level of financial con-
straints (smaller firms) and those with expected lower levels (larger firms). I then define indicator
variables for each category. For public firm age, I define an indicator variable for relatively young
public firms, those that underwent an IPO within the past five years. These firms have a short
history with capital markets and hence are likely to be more constrained. I define another indicator
variable for older firms that have been around as public firms for more than five years. I estimate a
triple difference model using equation 4.1. If financial constraints are important in retaining work-
ers, then we expect employee-entrepreneurship to be more pronounced in smaller and younger
financially distressed firms.
Table 4.2 presents the results. Columns [1] – [2] show the results for firm size. Employee
entrepreneurship is higher in smaller financially distressed firms. The estimate of βhigh is also
significantly different from βlow. Columns [3] – [4] show the results for firm age. Employee en-
trepreneurship is higher in younger financially distressed firms, but the difference from the older
firms is not statistically significant, potentially reflecting a low fraction of observations in younger
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firms (about 15% of all observations). Taken together, the results in Table 4.2 suggest that finan-
cially distressed firms are financially constrained to retain entrepreneurial workers.
Combined with the results on entrepreneur wages and start-up performance, the evidence pre-
sented in this section suggests that relatively more levered firms might be less able to retain high-
quality workers following industry shocks. These workers exit to found new firms when their
employers are more financially constrained and are also less able to enforce ex ante contracts
aimed to discourage their workers from starting competing new firms.
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Table 4.1: The Enforceability of Non-compete Agreements and Worker Departures to En-
trepreneurship from Financially Distressed Firms
This table presents establishment-level analysis. The sample consists of establishments of U.S. public firms, and
extends from 1990 through 2003. The dependent variable Pct Entrepreneurs is the count of an establishment’s workers
defined as future entrepreneurs two years after the base year (the year during which distress is defined), normalized by
base year establishment employment and expressed in percentage terms; a worker is a future entrepreneur if, two years
after the base year, he works at a start-up (a firm founded during or after the base year) and is also one of the top five
earners at that start-up. IndDistress is an indicator variable equal to one if an industry-year is in distress. Leverage is the
firm book financial leverage ratio (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, normalized by total firm assets) lagged
by two years from the base year. Low (High) Enforceability Non-competes is an indicator variable equal to one for
establishments in states with the Noncompetition Enforceability Index value less than (greater or equal to) the median
value of the index, which is from Garmaise (2009). Non-compete agreements are employment contracts restricting
worker mobility to competing firms. All columns include leverage, industry distress indicator, as well as indicator
variable High Enforceability Non-Competes and its interactions with leverage and industry distress. Establishment
controls include establishment size and average worker wage. Firm controls are firm age, diversification, and the
following financial variables lagged by one year: sales growth, return on assets, investments, R&D expenses, Tobin’s
Q, firm size, asset tangibility, and cash holdings. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix A. Standard errors
are clustered at the SIC–3 code industry-level and are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels.
Dependent Variable: Pct Entrepreneurs
[1] [2] [3] [2] [3] [4]
Leverage × IndDistress × Low Enforceability Non-competes 2.315*** 2.458*** 3.207*** 3.196*** 3.058*** 3.047***
(0.685) (0.824) (1.123) (1.102) (1.151) (1.143)
Leverage × IndDistress × High Enforceability Non-competes 0.399 0.446 1.100*** 1.115*** 0.979** 0.996**
(0.371) (0.505) (0.348) (0.337) (0.445) (0.444)
Industry–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.028 0.035 0.512 0.512 0.520 0.521
Number of Observations 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100
F-test (difference) 9.990 11.732 3.585 3.525 2.971 2.898
p-val (difference) 0.002 0.001 0.060 0.062 0.087 0.091
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Table 4.2: The Effect of Firm Financial Constraints on the Ability of Firms to Retain En-
trepreneurial Workers
This table presents establishment-level analysis. The sample consists of establishments of U.S. public firms, and
extends from 1990 through 2003. The dependent variable Pct Entrepreneurs is the count of an establishment’s workers
defined as future entrepreneurs two years after the base year (the year during which distress is defined), normalized
by base year establishment employment and expressed in percentage terms; a worker is a future entrepreneur if, two
years after the base year, he works at a start-up (a firm founded during or after the base year) and is also one of the
top five earners at that start-up. IndDistress is an indicator variable equal to one if an industry-year is in distress.
Leverage is the firm book financial leverage ratio (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, normalized by total
firm assets) lagged by two years from the base year. Small (Large) Firm is an indicator variable equal to one for
establishments of firms with total assets below (above or equal to) the median firm’s assets. Young (Old) Firm is an
indicator variable equal to one for establishments of firms in Compustat for five years or fewer (more than five years).
All columns include leverage and industry distress indicator. Columns [1] - [2] ([3] - [4]) include an indicator variable
Large (Old) Firm and its interactions with leverage and industry distress. Establishment controls include establishment
size and average worker wage. Firm controls are firm age, diversification, and the following financial variables lagged
by one year: sales growth, return on assets, investments, R&D expenses, Tobin’s Q, firm size, asset tangibility, and
cash holdings. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC–3 code
industry-level and are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Dependent Variable: Pct Entrepreneurs
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Leverage × IndDistress × Small Firm 3.681*** 3.701***
(1.325) (1.317)
Leverage × IndDistress × Large Firm 0.703 0.704
(0.484) (0.477)
Leverage × IndDistress × Young Firm 3.449*** 3.381***
(1.193) (1.190)
Leverage × IndDistress × Old Firm 1.547** 1.568**
(0.618) (0.611)
Industry–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment Controls Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes
R-squared 0.520 0.521 0.520 0.521
Number of Observations 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100
F-test (difference) 4.573 4.701 2.079 1.911
p-val (difference) 0.034 0.032 0.151 0.169
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Other Mechanisms
Asset Appropriation Hypothesis. This hypothesis is based on a property rights view of the
theory of the firm (Grossman and Hart (1986); Hart and Moore (1990)). A firm is organized around
nonhuman assets, and employees do not have ownership rights to these assets. The underlying
assumption is that the firm has legal protection of its asset ownership and that its workers cannot
appropriate those assets. However, the firm’s ability to protect its assets depends on the financial
resources available to litigate. During financial distress, the cash flow available to the firm shrinks
and external financing becomes more expensive. Thus, the firm might become less financially able
to protect its existing assets, particularly intangible assets, the theft of which is more difficult to
prove and hence more expensive to litigate. Workers might perceive the financial weakness of their
employer and use the opportunity to appropriate the distressed employer’s assets in a new firm.4
For this story to hold, the rate of entrepreneurship in distressed firms should be higher in states
that more strictly enforce non-compete agreements. This prediction follows because financial abil-
ity to litigate a former employee for appropriating intangible assets should matter more in states
where firms can take the workers to court for competing activities. Since I find the opposite, it is
less likely that workers found start-ups to appropriate existing intangible assets of the employer.
Agency cost. Since financial distress can exacerbate agency problems inside the firm due to
separation of control and ownership, the next hypothesis is based on agency costs arising due to
managerial career concerns (Holmstro¨m (1999)). The principal-agent problem occurs between the
shareholder and the manager who derives private benefit from keeping his job. The manager bears
career risk when investments in promising but risky new ideas do not pan out due to poor luck,
but shareholders mistakenly attribute the failure to poor manager ability. Since investing in risky
projects during financial distress increases the risk of firm failure and job loss, the manager passes
on profitable but risky projects when the firm experiences financial distress. These rejected projects
can then be developed in start-ups. For this story to make intuitive sense, one must assume that
4Almeling, Snyder, and Sapoznikow (2009) report that, among legal cases involving trade secrets, the misappropriation
of intellectual property by former employees is the most common.
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would-be entrepreneurs are less risk averse than the manager. Given that the manager is likely to
be wealthier and hence less risk averse than the workers, this assumption seems strong. Thus, it is
unlikely that the higher rates of worker entrepreneurship following firm financial distress are due
to this story.
4.2 Discussion
Overall, I find that financial distress propels high-quality workers into entrepreneurship, but
mostly when firms are less able to enforce ex ante contracts discouraging the workers from pur-
suing related economic activity. The results are consistent with the “brain drain” hypothesis that
suggests that high-quality workers leave financially distressed firms to found start-ups to develop
their ideas. That said, the evidence is suggestive. Other stories might explain why financial distress
spurs entrepreneurship.
While the cross-sectional tests seem to support the “brain drain” hypothesis, the ability of
workers to fund their start-ups remains puzzling, particularly following industry downturns when
funding is likely limited. If the results are driven by industries that require considerable initial
capital, such as manufacturing, it is hard to explain why entrepreneurs can fund their ideas better
than public firms. I analyze whether employee-entrepreneurs exiting firms in financial distress are
more likely to come from industries with lower start-up costs. I find that, indeed, the effect is more
prevalent in industries with lower start-up capital requirements (see Table A.10 in the Appendix
for the regression results).
A related question asks why potential entrepreneurs do not get financing from other existing
firms. A fundamental problem in a market for ideas is that disclosing the idea exposes the worker
to the risk of expropriation because intellectual property rights protection is not perfect (Arrow
(1962)). Another firm’s willingness to fund depends on knowing the idea’s value, but the worker
might be reluctant to reveal the idea for the fear of it being stolen and instead might prefer to found
a start-up. Even respectful firms were known to appropriate ideas from entrepreneurs. Unable to
commercialize on his own, Robert Kearns, an independent inventor of the intermittent windshield
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wiper, approached the Ford Motor Company in the early 1960s. After some negotiation, Ford re-
jected a licensing agreement with Kearns but introduced a similar technology to the market shortly
thereafter. Kearns had a patent, but it was not until the 1990s that he successfully upheld his patent
and extracted a portion of the economic returns (Gans and Stern (2003)). Furthermore, many ideas
for new products or services are not patentable. Kearns’ case suggests that sharing non-patentable
ideas with potential outside investors involves even higher risk.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I identify an important but largely overlooked effect of firm financial lever-
age on new firm creation. My findings show that financial leverage, by making firms more vulner-
able in bad states of the world, weakens firm-worker ties and propels workers to start their own
firms. This new firm creation is higher when firms are less able to enforce ex ante contracts that
discourage workers from pursuing related economic activity. This “destructive creation” suggests
that some new firms arise when existing firms, weakened by shocks and burdened by debt, are less
able to retain entrepreneurial workers.
From the corporate finance perspective, this dissertation shows that firms’ reluctance to use
debt financing might stem from their wish to avoid losing productive workers to new firms dur-
ing financial distress. While worker entrepreneurship does not likely benefit distressed firms, the
findings suggest a silver lining to financial distress. Workers from financially distressed firms start
successful new ventures at a higher rate, suggesting that productive resources get reallocated from
old to new firms and that the social costs of financial distress might be lower than the private costs
to financially distressed firms. Firms do not exist in a vacuum. If firms in financial distress forgo
good investment opportunities, employees might still pursue those opportunities, but within the
boundaries of new firms.
This dissertation contributes to the recent discussion concerning the slow down in new firm
creation and labor turnover over the past 30 years in the U. S. (Davis and Haltiwanger (2014);
Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2014)). The results in this dissertation suggest that,
to the extent that firms can learn how to better weather financial shocks and hence better retain
workers, fewer new firms might not necessarily be an economically undesirable outcome. Without
understanding the reasons for the decline in start-ups, it is difficult to argue that the drop in start-up
creation is a bad trend.
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By providing evidence that employee entrepreneurship in financially distressed firms is driven
by smaller and younger firms, this dissertation also provides a novel explanation for why smaller
and younger firms spawn more start-ups. The existing literature argues that preference sorting
plays a major role in generating the small and young firm effect; i.e., small and young firms at-
tract workers with prior preferences for autonomy, who are similarly drawn into entrepreneurship
(Elfenbein et al. (2010); Ouimet and Zarutskie (2014)). However, an alternative finance-oriented
explanation centers around the finding that younger firms are more financially levered than pub-
lic firms (Robb and Robinson (2014)). This higher leverage makes smaller, younger firms more
vulnerable to shocks and less able to retain entrepreneurial employees.
Many successful firms are founded by people who leave paid employment. Yet, we know little
about when and why workers leave their employers to create new firms or about the role of the
employers in that decision. This dissertation is the first to show that capital structure decisions of
existing firms have implications for new firm creation. We also know that a firm’s venture capital
connections and business focus are important factors in entrepreneurial spawning (Gompers et al.
(2005)). Additionally, Babina, Ouimet, and Zarutskie (2015) find that IPO firms spur new firm
creation by endowing employees with the capital necessary to pursue entrepreneurship. But much
remains unknown about the roles of existing firms in new firm creation. Answering these questions
has implications for our understanding of firm boundaries, economic growth, and occupational
choices.
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APPENDIX A: ROBUSTNESS
Table A.1: The Effect of Firm Financial Distress on Establishment Employment Growth
This table presents establishment-level analysis. The sample consists of establishments of U.S. public firms, and
extends from 1990 through 2003. The dependent variable Establishment Employment Growth is measured over the
same period as the main entrepreneurship variable; it is defined in percentage terms and equals to the log-difference
between three-year future and base year employments, both measured as of the first quarter. Base year is the year
during which the distress is defined. IndDistress is an indicator variable equal to one if an industry-year is in distress.
Leverage is the firm book financial leverage ratio (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, normalized by total
firm assets) lagged by two years from the base year. Establishment controls include establishment size and average
worker wage. Firm controls are firm age, diversification, and the following financial variables lagged by one year:
sales growth, return on assets, investments, R&D expenses, Tobin’s Q, firm size, asset tangibility, and cash holdings.
Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC–3 code industry-level and
are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Dependent Variable: Establishment Employment Growth
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
IndDistress -2.675 0.237
(7.203) (6.448)
Leverage -63.324*** -42.645*** -0.652 -2.206 4.026 1.554
(10.039) (10.134) (13.178) (13.238) (12.770) (13.215)
Leverage × IndDistress -67.590** -59.487** -64.215** -64.498** -86.359*** -85.485***
(33.386) (29.025) (26.387) (26.345) (20.598) (19.729)
Industry–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.095 0.115 0.716 0.730 0.740 0.754
Number of Observations 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100
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Table A.2: Does Economic, not Financial, Distress Drive Entrepreneurship in Distressed Firms?
This table presents establishment-level analysis. The sample consists of establishments of U.S. public firms, and
extends from 1990 through 2003. The dependent variable Pct Entrepreneurs is the count of an establishment’s workers
defined as future entrepreneurs two years after the base year (the year during which the distress is defined), normalized
by base year establishment employment and expressed in percentage terms; a worker is a future entrepreneur if, two
years after the base year, he works at a start-up (a firm founded during or after the base year) and is also one of the
top five earners at that start-up. IndDistress is an indicator variable equal to one if an industry-year is in distress.
Leverage is the firm book financial leverage ratio (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, normalized by total
firm assets) lagged by two years from the base year. Negative (Non-Negative) Oper Income is an indicator variable
equal to one for firms with negative (non-negative) operating income (EBITDA) one year prior to the base year. All
columns include leverage and industry distress indicator. Columns [1] - [4] include an indicator variable Negative
Oper Income and its interactions with leverage and industry distress. Establishment controls include establishment
size and average worker wage. Firm controls are firm age, diversification, and the following financial variables lagged
by one year: sales growth, return on assets, investments, R&D expenses, Tobin’s Q, firm size, asset tangibility, and
cash holdings. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC–3 code
industry-level and are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Dependent Variable: Pct Entrepreneurs
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Leverage × IndDistress × Non-Negative Oper Income 1.355*** 1.313** 1.788*** 1.798*** 1.675*** 1.686***
(0.491) (0.588) (0.438) (0.423) (0.421) (0.409)
Leverage × IndDistress × Negative Oper Income 0.652 0.809 3.270 3.275 2.966 2.966
(1.630) (1.553) (2.711) (2.759) (2.903) (2.958)
Industry–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.029 0.035 0.512 0.513 0.520 0.521
Number of Observations 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100
F-test (difference) 0.219 0.143 0.327 0.306 0.221 0.207
p-valt (difference) 0.640 0.706 0.568 0.581 0.639 0.650
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Table A.3: The Effect of Firm Financial Distress on the Rate of Entrepreneurship Identified with
Firm Fixed Effects
This table presents establishment-level analysis. The sample consists of establishments of U.S. public firms, and
extends from 1990 through 2003. The dependent variable Pct Entrepreneurs is the count of an establishment’s workers
defined as future entrepreneurs two years after the base year (the year during which distress is defined), normalized
by base year establishment employment and expressed in percentage terms; a worker is a future entrepreneur if, two
years after the base year, he works at a start-up (a firm founded during or after the base year) and is also one of the
top five earners at that start-up. IndDistress is an indicator variable equal to one if an industry-year is in distress.
Leverage is the firm book financial leverage ratio (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, normalized by total
firm assets) lagged by two years from the base year. Establishment controls include establishment size and average
worker wage. Firm controls are firm age, diversification, and the following financial variables lagged by one year:
sales growth, return on assets, investments, R&D expenses, Tobin’s Q, firm size, asset tangibility, and cash holdings.
Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC–3 code industry-level and
are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Dependent Variable: Pct Entrepreneurs
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
IndDistress -0.271*** -0.306*** -0.309***
(0.067) (0.067) (0.053)
Leverage -0.160 -0.147 -0.117 -0.120 -0.163 -0.138
(0.156) (0.156) (0.153) (0.158) (0.165) (0.166)
Leverage × IndDistress 1.385*** 1.481*** 1.502*** 1.417*** 1.501*** 1.505***
(0.418) (0.422) (0.380) (0.420) (0.456) (0.430)
Industry FE Yes Yes
State–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry–Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Establishment Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.108 0.116 0.117 0.113 0.125 0.127
Number of Observations 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100
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Table A.4: The Effect of Firm Financial Distress on the Rate of Entrepreneurship Among Departing
Workers
This table presents establishment-level analysis. The sample consists of establishments of U.S. public firms, and ex-
tends from 1990 through 2003. The table reports the results with alternative normalization of future entrepreneurs. The
dependent variable Pct Entrepreneurs/Leave is the count of an establishment’s workers defined as future entrepreneurs
two years after the base year (the year during which the distress is defined), normalized by the number of the estab-
lishment’s employees who work for a different employer or who drop out from the employment sample two years after
the base year, and expressed in percentage terms; a worker is a future entrepreneur if, two years after the base year, he
works at a start-up (a firm founded during or after the base year) and is also one of the top five earners at that start-up.
Leverage is the firm book financial leverage ratio (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, normalized by total
firm assets) lagged by two years from the base year. Establishment controls include establishment size and average
worker wage. Firm controls are firm age, diversification, and the following financial variables lagged by one year:
sales growth, return on assets, investments, R&D expenses, Tobin’s Q, firm size, asset tangibility, and cash holdings.
Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC–3 code industry-level and
are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Dependent Variable: Pct Entrepreneurs/Leave
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
IndDistress -0.848*** -0.849***
(0.258) (0.234)
Leverage 0.259 0.262 -0.491 -0.438 -0.531 -0.494
(0.210) (0.186) (0.331) (0.344) (0.340) (0.356)
Leverage × IndDistress 2.454*** 2.620** 2.887** 2.888** 2.961** 2.981**
(0.823) (1.107) (1.221) (1.176) (1.329) (1.306)
Industry–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.025 0.028 0.459 0.459 0.468 0.468
Number of Observations 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100
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Table A.5: The Effect of Firm Financial Distress on the Rate of Worker Entrepreneurship in Eco-
nomically Significant Industries and Controlling for Firm-Initiated Spin-outs
This table presents establishment-level analysis. The sample consists of establishments of U.S. public firms, and
extends from 1990 through 2003. The dependent variable Pct Entrepreneurs is the count of an establishment’s workers
defined as future entrepreneurs two years after the base year (the year during which the distress is defined), normalized
by base year establishment employment and expressed in percentage terms; a worker is a future entrepreneur if, two
years after the base year, he works at a start-up (a firm founded during or after the base year) and is also one of the top
five earners at that start-up. IndDistress is an indicator variable equal to one if an industry-year is in distress. Leverage
is the firm book financial leverage ratio (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, normalized by total firm assets)
lagged by two years from the base year. Big Industry is an indicator variable equal to one when an establishment
belongs to an industry that comprises at least ten percent of the firm total employment. No Spin-offs is an indicator
variable equal to one when less than fifty percent of employees exit to work at start-ups two years after the base
year. All columns include leverage and industry distress indicator. Establishment controls include establishment size
and average worker wage. Firm controls are firm age, diversification, and the following financial variables lagged
by one year: sales growth, return on assets, investments, R&D expenses, Tobin’s Q, firm size, asset tangibility, and
cash holdings. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC–3 code
industry-level and are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Dependent Variable: Pct Entrepreneurs
[1] [2] [3]
Leverage × IndDistress × Big Industry 1.771*** 1.785***
(0.390) (0.382)
Leverage × IndDistress × No Spin-offs 1.685** 1.692**
(0.657) (0.651)
Industry–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment Controls Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes
R-squared 0.520 0.520 0.520 0.520
Number of Observations 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100
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Table A.6: The Effect of Firm Financial Distress on the Rate of Worker Entrepreneurship: Alter-
native Definitions of Financial Leverage
This table presents establishment-level analysis. The sample consists of establishments of U.S. public firms, and
extends from 1990 through 2003. The dependent variable Pct Entrepreneurs is the count of an establishment’s workers
defined as future entrepreneurs two years after the base year (the year during which the distress is defined), normalized
by base year establishment employment and expressed in percentage terms; a worker is a future entrepreneur if, two
years after the base year, he works at a start-up (a firm founded during or after the base year) and is also one of the top
five earners at that start-up. IndDistress is an indicator variable equal to one if an industry-year is in distress. Market
Leverage is the firm market financial leverage ratio (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, normalized by total
market value of firm assets) lagged by two years from the base year. Net Leverage is the firm net book financial
leverage ratio (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities minus cash and short-term securities, normalized by
total market value of firm assets) lagged by two years from the base year. Long-term Leverage is the firm long-term
debt normalized by total firm assets, and lagged by two years from the base year. Interest Expense/Assets is the firm
interest and related expense normalized by total firm assets, and lagged by two years from the base year. Establishment
controls include establishment size and average worker wage. Firm controls are firm age, diversification, and the
following financial variables lagged by one year: sales growth, return on assets, investments, R&D expenses, Tobin’s
Q, firm size, asset tangibility, and cash holdings. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix A. Standard errors
are clustered at the SIC–3 code industry-level and are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels.
Dependent Variable: Pct Entrepreneurs
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Market Leverage -0.111 -0.049
(0.164) (0.169)
Market Leverage × IndDistress 1.090** 1.085**
(0.457) (0.445)
Net Leverage -0.141 -0.117
(0.164) (0.170)
Net Leverage × IndDistress 1.214*** 1.220***
(0.286) (0.279)
Long-term Leverage -0.136 -0.090
(0.203) (0.209)
Long-term Leverage × IndDistress 1.993*** 1.996***
(0.536) (0.529)
Interest Expense/Assets -1.641 -1.457
(1.661) (1.757)
Interest Expense/Assets × IndDistress 24.800** 24.796**
(10.727) (10.681)
Industry–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.520 0.520 0.520 0.520 0.520 0.520 0.520 0.521
Number of Observations 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100
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Table A.7: The Effect of Firm Financial Distress on the Quality of Entrepreneurs: Report All
Controls
This table presents entrepreneur-level analysis. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix A. Standard errors
are clustered at the SIC–3 code industry-level and are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels.
Dependent Variable: Worker Ex Ante Earnings Worker Ex Post Earnings Worker Earnings Growth
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Leverage 0.056 0.038 -0.032 -0.037 -0.033 -0.041*
(0.094) (0.029) (0.032) (0.025) (0.031) (0.024)
Leverage × IndDistress 0.862** 0.481*** 0.225** 0.139** 0.241** 0.151**
(0.413) (0.088) (0.110) (0.059) (0.108) (0.061)
Worker Age 0.117*** 0.105*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.024***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Worker Age Squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Worker Female -0.252*** -0.241*** -0.268*** -0.270*** -0.263*** -0.265***
(0.062) (0.035) (0.031) (0.026) (0.030) (0.025)
Worker White 0.190*** 0.154*** 0.112*** 0.106*** 0.110*** 0.104***
(0.035) (0.019) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Worker Foreign Born 0.046 0.005 -0.013 -0.020 -0.013 -0.020
(0.049) (0.029) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
Worker In-State Born -0.100*** -0.078*** -0.027*** -0.023*** -0.026*** -0.023***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Worker Education 0.045*** 0.035*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Worker Total Experience -0.005** -0.006*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Worker Tenure 0.170*** 0.153*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.013) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Establishment Size -0.063*** -0.034*** -0.033***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Establishment Mean Wage (Excl. Worker) 0.869*** 0.147*** 0.144***
(0.078) (0.030) (0.030)
Firm Age 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Diversified Firm -0.059* -0.045*** -0.049***
(0.034) (0.017) (0.018)
Firm Sales Growth 0.091*** -0.018** -0.018**
(0.025) (0.009) (0.008)
Firm Return on Assets -0.090 -0.097* -0.103*
(0.067) (0.054) (0.054)
Firm Investments 0.133* 0.240*** 0.240***
(0.077) (0.070) (0.071)
Firm R&D -0.084 0.168 0.068
(0.161) (0.262) (0.269)
Firm Tobin’s Q 0.010 0.004 0.006
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Firm Size 0.001 -0.005 -0.005
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Firm Asset Tangibility -0.074 -0.080* -0.075*
(0.062) (0.041) (0.039)
Firm Cash 0.005 -0.029 -0.049
(0.077) (0.044) (0.056)
Worker Ex Ante Earnings 0.332*** 0.316*** -0.660*** -0.676***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011)
Industry–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.410 0.458 0.231 0.235 0.393 0.396
Number of Observations 315,200 315,200 315,200 315,200 315,200 315,200
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Table A.8: The Effect of Firm Financial Distress on the Quality of Startups: Report All Controls
This table presents startup-level analysis. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix A. Standard errors are
clustered at the SIC–3 code industry-level and are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels.
Dependent Variable: Startup Exit Startup Future Empl Startup Empl Growth
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Leverage 0.006 0.011 0.023 0.007 0.026 0.012
(0.006) (0.007) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Leverage × IndDistress -0.052** -0.039 0.198*** 0.166** 0.172*** 0.143**
(0.024) (0.025) (0.064) (0.067) (0.062) (0.064)
Worker Age -0.000 -0.000 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Worker Age Squared 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Worker Female -0.017*** -0.016*** 0.011 0.011 0.006 0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Worker White -0.031*** -0.031*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.021***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Worker Foreign Born -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.022 -0.022 -0.028* -0.027**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Worker In-State Born -0.002 -0.002 -0.020** -0.020** -0.019** -0.019**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Worker Education -0.001 -0.000 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Worker Total Experience 0.000 0.000 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Worker Tenure -0.004*** -0.005*** 0.005* 0.006** 0.004 0.005**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Worker Ex Ante Earnings -0.013*** -0.012*** 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.083*** 0.084***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Startup Age at Joining -0.044*** -0.044*** 0.160*** 0.160*** 0.146*** 0.145***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Startup Initial Empl -0.015*** -0.015*** 0.180*** 0.180*** -0.327*** -0.327***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Establishment Size 0.002* -0.016*** -0.015***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Establishment Mean Wage (Excl. Worker) -0.010*** -0.015 -0.019
(0.003) (0.014) (0.013)
Firm Age -0.001*** 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Diversified Firm -0.001 -0.002 0.001
(0.007) (0.020) (0.019)
Firm Sales Growth -0.007 0.023 0.029**
(0.006) (0.015) (0.013)
Firm Return on Assets 0.011 -0.078* -0.077*
(0.015) (0.044) (0.045)
Firm Investments 0.027* 0.047 0.057
(0.016) (0.055) (0.056)
Firm R&D 0.165*** -0.043 -0.000
(0.051) (0.204) (0.189)
Firm Tobin’s Q -0.001 -0.005 -0.006
(0.003) (0.011) (0.011)
Firm Size 0.003*** -0.006** -0.005**
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Firm Asset Tangibility -0.006 -0.037 -0.034
(0.009) (0.024) (0.024)
Firm Cash 0.002 -0.049 -0.046
(0.023) (0.060) (0.052)
Industry–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.021 0.022 0.038 0.038 0.075 0.076
Number of Observations 315,200 315,200 315,200 315,200 315,200 315,200
64
Table A.9: Startup Characteristics as a Function of the Spawning Firm Financial Distress
This table presents startup-level analysis. The sample consists of start-ups founded by workers who exit establishments
of U.S. public firms from 1990 through 2003. Startup Same Ind is an indicator variable equal to one if an SIC–2
industry of the start-up and the spawning establishment is the same. Startup Initial Empl is the natural logarithm of
a start-up employment plus one in the first year of the start-up’s existence. Detailed variable definitions are in the
Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC–3 code industry-level and are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Dependent Variable: Startup Same Ind Startup Inital Empl
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Leverage 0.062*** 0.047*** 0.003 0.001
(0.022) (0.017) (0.010) (0.011)
Leverage × IndDistress -0.019 -0.030 -0.046 -0.047
(0.025) (0.019) (0.034) (0.033)
Worker Age 0.008** 0.001
(0.003) (0.001)
Worker Age Squared -0.000** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Worker Female -0.028*** -0.015***
(0.006) (0.002)
Worker White -0.007 -0.018***
(0.007) (0.003)
Worker Foreign Born 0.002 -0.035***
(0.015) (0.005)
Worker In-State Born -0.008*** -0.006**
(0.003) (0.003)
Worker Education 0.003*** 0.001**
(0.001) (0.001)
Worker Tenure -0.004*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Worker Total Experience 0.003** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Worker Ex Ante Earnings 0.028*** 0.010***
(0.004) (0.001)
Establishment Size -0.025*** -0.001
(0.003) (0.001)
Establishment Mean Wage (Excl. Worker) 0.022* -0.006
(0.012) (0.004)
Firm Age -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
Diversified Firm -0.029** -0.008
(0.012) (0.009)
Firm Sales Growth 0.013** -0.002
(0.006) (0.006)
Firm Return on Assets 0.011 -0.017
(0.028) (0.028)
Firm Investments 0.014 0.024
(0.025) (0.036)
Firm R&D -0.195** 0.101*
(0.075) (0.056)
Firm Tobin’s Q -0.001 -0.000
(0.006) (0.004)
Firm Size -0.005*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Firm Asset Tangibility 0.001 -0.004
(0.018) (0.011)
Firm Cash 0.030 -0.006
(0.031) (0.017)
Industry–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.177 0.205 0.014 0.015
Number of Observations 315,200 315,200 315,200 315,200
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Table A.10: The Effect of Firm Financial Distress on the Rate of Worker Entrepreneurship in Low
Startup Capital Industries and High Tech Industries
This table presents establishment-level analysis. The sample consists of establishments of U.S. public firms, and
extends from 1990 through 2003. The dependent variable Pct Entrepreneurs is the count of an establishment’s workers
defined as future entrepreneurs two years after the base year (the year during which the distress is defined), normalized
by base year establishment employment and expressed in percentage terms; a worker is a future entrepreneur if, two
years after the base year, he works at a start-up (a firm founded during or after the base year) and is also one of the top
five earners at that start-up. IndDistress is an indicator variable equal to one if an industry-year is in distress. Leverage
is the firm book financial leverage ratio (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, normalized by total firm assets)
lagged by two years from the base year. High Startup Cost Ind is an indicator variable equal to one for establishments
in industries with high start-up costs. High Tech Ind is an indicator variable equal to one for establishments in a
high-tech industry (Biotech, Computer, Electronics, and Telecom). All columns include leverage and industry distress
indicator. Columns [1] - [2] ([3] - [4]) include an indicator variable High Startup Cost Ind (High Tech Ind) and
its interactions with leverage and industry distress. Establishment controls include establishment size and average
worker wage. Firm controls are firm age, diversification, and the following financial variables lagged by one year:
sales growth, return on assets, investments, R&D expenses, Tobin’s Q, firm size, asset tangibility, and cash holdings.
Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC–3 code industry-level and
are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Dependent Variable: Pct Entrepreneurs
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Leverage × IndDistress × Low Startup Cost Ind 2.120*** 2.118***
(0.649) (0.649)
Leverage × IndDistress × High Startup Cost Ind 1.243 1.268
(0.876) (0.864)
Leverage × IndDistress × Non-High Tech Ind 1.594** 1.623***
(0.625) (0.614)
Leverage × IndDistress × High Tech Ind 2.203*** 2.183**
(0.842) (0.853)
Industry–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State–Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment Controls Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes
R-squared 0.520 0.520 0.520 0.520
Number of Observations 91,100 91,100 91,100 91,100
F-test (difference) 0.656 0.623 0.340 0.286
p-val (difference) 0.419 0.431 0.561 0.594
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APPENDIX B: VARIABLE DEFINITION
Establishment-level Variables
Pct Entrepreneurs – the count of an establishment’s workers defined as future entrepreneurs
two years after the base year (the year during which distress is defined), normalized by base year
establishment employment and expressed in percentage terms; a worker is a future entrepreneur if,
two years after the base year, he works at a start-up (a firm founded during or after the base year)
and is also one of the top five earners at that start-up. This is the main definition of entrepreneurship
used in the paper. Source: LBD and LEHD
Pct Entrepreneurs/Change Employer – the count of an establishment’s workers defined as fu-
ture entrepreneurs according to the main definition, normalized by the number of the establish-
ment’s employees who work for a different employer two years after the base year, and expressed
in percentage terms. Source: LBD and LEHD
Pct Entrepreneurs/Leave – the count of an establishment’s workers defined as future entrepreneurs
according to the main definition, normalized by the number of the establishment’s employees who
work for a different employer or who drop out from the employment sample two years after the
base year, and expressed in percentage terms. Source: LBD and LEHD
Pct Main Founder – the count of an establishment’s workers who, two years after the base
year, work at start-ups and are also the top earners at those start-ups, normalized by base year
establishment employment and expressed in percentage terms. Source: LBD and LEHD
Pct Startups – the count of unique start-ups associated with future entrepreneurs defined ac-
cording to the main definition, normalized by base year establishment employment and expressed
in percentage terms. Source: LBD and LEHD
Pct Stay – the percent of an establishment’s workers who, two years after the base year, still
work at the firm. Source: LBD and LEHD
Pct Move Existing – the percent of an establishment’s workers who, two years after the base
year, work at a different firm that existed prior to the base year. Source: LBD and LEHD
Pct Drop-out – the percent of an establishment’s workers who, two years after the base year,
67
drop out from the employment sample. Source: LBD and LEHD
Pct Move Startups – the percent of the establishment’s workers who, two years after the base
year, work at start-ups. Source: LBD and LEHD
Establishment Size – the natural logarithm of the number of SEIN workers plus one, measured
as of the first quarter of the base year to reflect characteristics of the workers in the establishment-
worker panel. The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of its empirical distribution.
Source: LEHD
Establishment Mean Wage – the natural logarithm of the ratio of an establishment’s payroll
to employment, measured as of the first quarter of the base year to reflect characteristics of the
workers in the establishment-worker panel. Payroll is quarterly and measured in constant 2014
dollars. The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of its empirical distribution.
Source: LEHD
Establishment Mean Worker Age – the establishment mean worker age, in years. Source:
LEHD
Establishment Percent Female – the percent of female workers at a given establishment-year.
Source: LEHD
Establishment Mean Worker Education – the worker education, averaged at an establishment-
year level. Education is measured in years and imputed in the LEHD database. Source: LEHD
Establishment Mean Worker Tenure – the number of years a worker is at the SEIN, averaged
at an establishment-year level. The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of its
empirical distribution. Source: LEHD
Big Industry – an indicator variable equal to one when an establishment belongs to an industry
that comprises at least ten percent of the firm total employment. Source: LBD
No Spin-offs – an indicator variable equal to one when less than fifty percent of employees exit
to work at start-ups two years after the base year. Source: LBD and LEHD
Establishment Employment Growth – measured over the same period as the main entrepreneur-
ship variable; it is defined in percentage terms and equal to the log-difference between three-year
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future and base year employments, both measured as of the first quarter. Base year is the year
during which distress is defined. Source: LEHD
Firm-level Variables
Leverage – the firm book financial leverage ratio (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities,
normalized by total firm assets) lagged by two years from the base year. It is set to missing if
negative and set equal to one if larger than one. Source: Compustat
Firm Age – the age of the oldest establishment that the firm owns in the first year the firm
is observed in the LBD (Haltiwanger et al. (2012)). The firm then ages by one year for each
additional year it is observed in the data. This definition of firm age is robust to misclassifying
an establishment that changes ownership through mergers and acquisitions as a firm birth, since a
firm is defined as a new firm only when all the establishments at the firm are new. Since the LBD
coverage starts in 1976, firm age is left censored for firms that existed prior to 1976. Source: LBD
Diversified Firm – an indicator variable equal to one when a firm has establishments in more
than one SIC–3 industry as of the year in which the industry distress is defined. Source: LBD
Firm Sales Growth – the firm sales growth lagged by one year from the base year. The variable
is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of its empirical distribution. Source: Compustat
Firm Return on Assets – the firm operating income (EDITDA) normalized by total firm assets
and lagged by one year from the base year. The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles
of its empirical distribution. Source: Compustat
Firm Investments – the firm CAPEX minus property, plant, and equipment sales divided by
total firm assets and lagged by one year from the base year. The variable is winsorized at the 1st
and 99th percentiles of its empirical distribution. Source: Compustat
Firm R&D – the firm research and development expenses divided by total firm assets. Research
and development expenses are set to zero when missing. The variable is lagged by one year from
the base year and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of its empirical distribution. Source:
Compustat and CRSP
Firm Tobin’s Q – the firm market value of assets (market value of common equity plus total
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assets minus book value of common equity) divided by the book value of total firm assets. The
market value of common equity is the number of common shares times stock price at the end
of the fiscal year. The book value of common equity is common equity plus deferred taxes and
investment tax credit. It is lagged by one year from the base year and winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentiles of its empirical distribution. Source: Compustat
Firm Size – the natural logarithm of total firm assets. It is lagged by one year from the base
year and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of its empirical distribution. Source: Compustat
Firm Asset Tangibility – the firm property, plant, and equipment normalized by total firm assets.
The variable is lagged by one year from the base year and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles
of its empirical distribution. Source: Compustat
Firm Cash – the firm cash and short-term investments divided by total firm assets. The variable
is lagged by one year from the base year and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of its
empirical distribution. Source: Compustat
Small (Large) Firm – an indicator variable equal to one for establishments of firms with one
year lagged total assets below (above or equal to) the median firm’s assets. The sorting is done
within each year. Source: Compustat
Young (Old) Firm – an indicator variable equal to one for establishments of firms in Compustat
for five years or fewer (more than five years). Source: Compustat
Market Leverage – the firm market financial leverage ratio (long-term debt plus debt in current
liabilities, normalized by total market value of firm assets) lagged by two years from the base year.
Total market value of firm assets is equal to market value of common equity plus total assets minus
book value of common equity. The market value of common equity is the number of common
shares times stock price at the end of the fiscal year. The book value of common equity is common
equity plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit. The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles of its empirical distribution. Source: Compustat
Net Leverage – the firm net book financial leverage ratio (long-term debt plus debt in current
liabilities minus cash and short-term securities, normalized by total market value of firm assets)
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lagged by two years from the base year. The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles
of its empirical distribution. Source: Compustat
Long-term Leverage – the firm long-term debt normalized by total firm assets, and lagged by
two years from the base year. The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of its
empirical distribution. Source: Compustat
Interest Expense/Assets – the firm interest and related expense normalized by total firm as-
sets, and lagged by two years from the base year. The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles of its empirical distribution. Source: Compustat
Negative (Non-Negative) Oper Income – an indicator variable equal to one for firms with neg-
ative (non-negative) operating income (EBITDA) one year prior to the base year. Source: Compu-
stat
Industry-level Variables
IndDistress – an indicator variable equal to one if an industry-year is in distress and zero oth-
erwise. Please refer to section 2 for detailed explanation. Source: Compustat and CRSP
High Startup Cost Ind – an indicator variable equal to one for establishments in industries with
high start-up costs. Two-digit NAICS sector industries are sorted by the average capital amount
necessary to start a business. Industries above (below) the median get assigned into high (low)
start-up cost industries. The data are from the Survey of Business Owners (SBO) Public Use
Microdata Sample (PUMS) using responses to the question about Amount of start-up or acquisi-
tion capital for each firm with employees in the 2007 survey year. Source: Adelino, Schoar, and
Severino (2015), Table A5 in the internet appendix.
High Tech Ind – is an indicator variable equal to one for establishments in a high-tech industry,
which includes Biotech (SIC codes 2830-2839, 3826, 3841-3851, 5047, 5048, 5122, 6324, 7352,
8000-8099, or 8730-8739 excluding 8732); Computer (SIC codes 5370-5379, 5044, 5045, 5734,
or 7370-7379); Electronics (SIC codes 3600-3629, 3643, 3644, 3670-3699, 3825, 5065, or 5063);
and Telecom (SIC codes 3660-3669 or 4810-4899). Source: Ouimet and Zarutskie (2014), Table
6.
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State-level Variables
Low (High) Enforceability Non-Competes – an indicator variable equal to one for establish-
ments in states with the Noncompetition Enforceability Index value less than (greater or equal to)
5, the median value of the index. The index measures how strictly states enforce non-compete
agreements, which are contracts between employers and employees that restrict worker post-
employment mobility into competing firms. Source: Garmaise (2009)
Worker-level Variables
Worker Age – the worker age in years. The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles
of its empirical distribution. Source: LEHD
Worker Female – an indicator variable equal to one if a worker is female. Source: LEHD
Worker White – an indicator variable equal to one if a worker is white. Source: LEHD
Worker Foreign Born – an indicator variable equal to one if a worker was born outside of the
U.S. Source: LEHD
Worker In-State Born – an indicator variable equal to one if a worker was born outside the
state of location of the establishment of a public firm. Source: LEHD
Worker Education – the number of years of education. Note: education is imputed in the LEHD
database. The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of its empirical distribution.
Source: LEHD
Worker Total Experience – the number of years a worker is in the LEHD. Note: since LEHD
coverage starts in 1990, the variable is left censored. The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles of its empirical distribution. Source: LEHD
Worker Tenure – the number of years a worker is at the establishment of a public firm. Note:
since the LEHD coverage starts in 1990, the variable is left censored. The variable is winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentiles of its empirical distribution. Source: LEHD
Worker Ex Ante Earnings – the natural logarithm of the real wages earned at a public firm
during the quarter the worker is identified with that firm. Real earnings are in constant 2014
dollars. The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of its empirical distribution.
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Source: LEHD
Worker Ex Post Earnings – the natural logarithm of total three-year real wages earned since
the worker became identified as an entrepreneur. For example, for the employee at a public firm
in the first quarter of 1998 who left and was identified with a start-up in the first quarter of 2001,
I sum his real earnings in 2001, 2002, and 2003. Real earnings are in constant 2014 dollars. The
variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of its empirical distribution. Source: LEHD
Worker Earnings Growth – the log-difference between ex post and ex ante earnings, where
ex ante earnings are calculated similarly to ex post earnings. For example, to calculate ex ante
earnings for the employee at a Compustat firm in the first quarter of 1998, I sum his real earnings
in 1995, 1996, and 1997. Real earnings are in constant 2014 dollars. The variable is winsorized at
the 1st and 99th percentiles of its empirical distribution. Source: LEHD
Establishment Mean Wage (Excl. Worker) – the establishment mean wage calculated for a
given worker, and excludes that worker’s wage from the calculation of the mean. It is equal to
the the natural logarithm of an establishment quarterly real payroll minus the worker real wage
divided by the number of workers at the establishment, not counting the worker; measured as of
the first quarter of the base year to reflect characteristics of the workers in the establishment-worker
panel. Real earnings are in constant 2014 dollars. The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles of its empirical distribution. Source: LEHD
Startup-level Variables
Startup Age at Joining – the start-up age in years during the year it is identified with the en-
trepreneur, taking values from one to three, inclusively. Source: LBD
Startup Same Ind – an indicator variable equal to one if an SIC–2 industry of the start-up and
the spawning establishment is the same. Source: LBD and LEHD
Startup Initial Empl – the natural logarithm of start-up employment plus one in the first year of
the start-up’s existence. The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of its empirical
distribution. Source: LBD
Startup Exit – an indicator variable equal to one if a start-up exits by the fifth year since it
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became identified with the entrepreneur. Source: LBD
Startup Future Empl – the natural logarithm of start-up employment plus one in five years
since it became identified with the entrepreneur. The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles of its empirical distribution. Source: LBD
Startup Empl Growth – the log-difference between start-up future and initial employment. The
variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of its empirical distribution. Source: LBD
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